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ABSTRACT 
Hindsight gives the nation much clarity regarding the cause of the failure to prevent the 
tragic events of 9/11. Calls for reform challenge the intelligence community, and law 
enforcement in general, to create the collaborative capacity to connect the dots, dare to 
imagine, and become accustomed to expecting the unexpected. Throughout the various 
reformation efforts over the last nine years, one central theme endures: the ability to share 
intelligence across interagency and intergovernmental barriers is imperative. The 
inextricable link between foreign and domestic intelligence demands that changes be 
made to smooth the continuum of efforts from public safety, to homeland security, to 
national security. If the quality of intelligence in this continuum is directly related to the 
depth and breadth of information available, then the participating agencies must be fully 
networked. Such a network is one way to transform the unknowingly relevant into 
potentially actionable intelligence. How else can domestic events be understood in an 
international context (or vice versa)?  
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In 2007, the Homeland Security Council defined “homeland security” in its 
document “National Strategy for Homeland Security” as “a concerted national effort to 
prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to 
terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur” (Homeland 
Security Council, 2007, p. 3). The “National Strategy for Homeland Security” also calls 
upon law enforcement agencies to increase their situational awareness within the 
communities they serve with the implementation of intelligence-led policing (ILP) 
(Homeland Security Council, 2007, pp. 19–20). 
However, according to David Carter and Jeremy Carter, there is no universally 
accepted definition of ILP (2009, p. 315). ILP is defined as a process resulting in an 
intelligence product for decision makers (United States Department of Justice, Bureau of 
Justice Assistance [USDOJ, BJA], 2005, pp. 3–4), as an approach built upon the tactics 
of various policing model, such as community-oriented policing (COP) (Carter, 2004, pp. 
41–44; Loyka et. al., 2005, p. 8; Peterson, Morehouse & Wright, 2002, pp. 13–16), and as 
a collaborative philosophy (Fuentes, 2006, p. 3). Despite its different meanings, ILP 
serves a purpose in policing: an effective ILP program provides law enforcement 
managers and executives with an actionable intelligence product used for sound decision 
making, strategic targeting, and more efficient resource allocation, whereas lack of clarity 
and the inefficient allocation of resources hinder an agency’s ability to detect and prevent 
acts of crime and terrorism and to save lives. 
As a business model, ILP involves six steps, referred to as the “Intelligence 
Cycle”: planning and direction, collection, processing and collation, analysis, 
dissemination, and reevaluation (Peterson, 2005, pp. 6–7, Peterson, et. al., 2002, pp. 79–
118, USDOJ, BJA, 2005, p. 3; Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. x). Each step in the process may 
use different technology, have varying training and legal requirements, and involve 
different divisions, units, or bureaus. For the purposes of this thesis, the components of 
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the intelligence cycle used to evaluate the California law enforcement community’s ILP 
capacity involve planning and direction, collection, and the dissemination—including the 
sharing—of crime- and terrorism-related information.  
The planning and direction components require law enforcement executives to 
recognize the dual imperative of collecting crime- and terrorism-related information in a 
more collaborative, cohesive, and integrative fashion in order to enhance the California 
law enforcement community’s ability to reduce crime and improve the hometown living 
environment wherein their constituents live, work, and play. However, a push for a strong 
collection effort may cause officers to collect hundreds of thousands—if not millions—of 
pieces of information annually. In order to avoid the random collection of information, it 
is important for law enforcement decision makers to identify and clearly articulate the 
information they want gathered and to continue to provide training to their troops so that 
they understand the federal and state guidelines within which they must operate to avoid 
the violation of civil rights. 
Focusing on the operational aspect of collection, many law enforcement officers 
receive training on the recognition of preincident indicators, otherwise known as 
“suspicious activity,” that may have a nexus to terrorism. In many cases, the “suspicious 
activity” is documented on a generalized report like an “incident report,” however, this 
reporting mechanism is not a standardized reporting format used by all law enforcement 
agencies. The need for law enforcement agencies to standardize their reports and use 
common collection codes to assist in the identification of crime trends, including 
terrorism-related activities, is detailed in a 2008 multiagency report entitled, “Findings 
and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Support and 
Implementation Project” (USDOJ, BJA, 2008, p. 3). In addition, an effective information 
gathering effort requires a cohesive and collaborative police/community partnership, 
because a strong law enforcement/community partnership provides the mechanism that 
ILP needs for the dual imperative of collecting crime- and terrorism-related information.  
Clearly, a need exists to share the information that law enforcement agencies have 
gathered and identified as “dots” or suspicious activity that could lead to a criminal act, 
including terrorism. It is also critical to understand that every law enforcement agency in 
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the country has data including “dots” that have not yet been identified as “dots.” As an 
example, a SAR report might be generated in one jurisdiction where suspicious activity 
causes interest but is not enough to act upon—a potential “dot.” A ticket totally unrelated 
to any crime other than a traffic offense might reside in the database of a distant 
jurisdiction without raising a suspicion of terrorist activity, but when combined with a 
“dot” from another jurisdiction, an analysis of those “dots” leads to the development of 
significant intelligence (e.g., connecting the dots).  
As members of the law enforcement community begin to collect traditional crime- 
and terrorism-related information in a more organized fashion, how do these agencies 
most effectively share this information with other homeland security professionals such 
as neighboring law enforcement agencies, the FBI, and the Department of Homeland 
Security? The two major data-mining systems currently used by California law 
enforcement agencies supporting an agency’s information-sharing efforts are COPLINK 
and the Law Enforcement Information Exchange (LInX). However, no formal standard 
operating procedures exist that regulate the sharing of information: this is significant 
because a lack of standards and policies is one of the top five impediments in the flow of 
intelligence information among law enforcement agencies ( USDOJ, BJA, 2005, p. 3). 
The lack of integrated data-sharing systems hinders the ability of California law 
enforcement agencies and the entire homeland security community to detect the threat 
and reduce the impact of crime and terrorism in the United States. Therefore, California 
law enforcement agencies would benefit from the identification of a data-mining system, 
or more than one system if the systems can effectively interface and share information, 
instead of independently selecting one of the many disparate systems available. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The California law enforcement community must be collaborative, proactive, and 
coordinated in its information gathering and sharing efforts to more effectively direct its 




addressed in this thesis are, “What is the ILP capacity among the California law 
enforcement community, and how can California agencies strengthen their homeland 
security efforts using ILP?”  
C. SPECIFIC RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The research anticipated an outcome demonstrating that policing in America is 
transitioning from the community policing model of the 1980s to an intelligence-led 
policing business model where the focus is now on the intelligence processes used to 
influence police procedures. This thesis demonstrates that strengthening the collection 
and dissemination components of ILP throughout the California law enforcement 
community will assist those agencies in being more effective in combating crime and 
terrorism because enhanced community/police partnerships will result in more actionable 
intelligence products. 
The research reveals that, although much progress is being made in the 
institutionalization of the policies and procedures inherent to ILP, no framework for 
connectivity exists to standardize and forcibly implement mechanisms necessary to fully 
network the law enforcement community. A fully networked and integrated law 
enforcement community overcomes the inherent gap and vulnerabilities in its homeland 
security efforts resulting from the use of disparate data-mining systems. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This thesis demonstrates that a transition in the current policing model is 
underway, that police practitioners and scholars recognize the crime-prevention value of 
ILP, and that the California law enforcement community’s current ILP capacity creates 
gaps in its information collection and sharing efforts, thereby hindering its ability to 
detect and prevent acts of crime and terrorism and save lives. 
Future research efforts should include the development of a national model of 




facilitate the sharing of information, the official identification of integrated data-mining 
systems, and a value assessment of centralizing the California law enforcement 
community. 
The immediate consumers of this thesis are law enforcement community 
members, homeland security practitioners, and national leaders. 
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II. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Research reveals that the criminals that law enforcement officers face today are 
more sophisticated and operationally agile due to the vast and instantaneous information 
found on the Internet and the ease and availability of various mass-transit systems. As a 
result, the traditional jurisdictional boundaries for criminals have been erased. This 
paradigm shift causes law enforcement agencies to develop ways with which to combat 
crime in a more structured and modernized business process manner, resulting in the need 
for a comprehensive reformation in state and local law enforcement intelligence 
operations (Peterson, 2005, p. vii). A transformational change in police programs and 
philosophies is needed to address the new threat environment. The focus of this literature 
review centers on the evolution of policing from the political era to the hometown 
security era with the implementation of intelligence-led policing (ILP), the history and 
application of intelligence as it relates to ILP, and the information collection and 
dissemination components of the ILP policing process. 
Scholarly journals, police trade magazines, governmental reports, and police 
practitioners, foundations, associations, and organizations all discuss the evolution and 
efficacy of policing models and practices. A review of relevant literature regarding the 
evolution of policing programs and practices since the mid to late 1800s reveals a 
knowledge gap relating to police effectiveness studies until the late 1970s. During the 
1970s and after, several police scholars and practitioners set out to discover which 
policing models impact crime rates and citizen satisfaction levels. In a review of the 
literature, one finds that for every position taken by scholars, practitioners, or 
professional organizations regarding what does and does not work in policing, one will 
find a counter or opposing position. However, what these police scholars and 
practitioners have in common is their desire to uncover which policing business models, 
practices, programs, and philosophies have the greatest impact on the prevention, 
deterrence, and disruption of criminal acts. One identified practice found to be effective 
in combating crime is the incorporation of the intelligence cycle into policing practices. 
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Decision making based on the gathering and analysis of information, the 
cornerstone of the intelligence cycle, dates back hundreds of years for the military and 
was formalized at the federal level with the establishment of the intelligence community 
(IC) in 1947. Mark Lowenthal opined in his 2009 book entitled Intelligence from Secrets 
to Policy that excluding subversion, espionage, and terrorism, internal domestic security 
activities (i.e., the gathering of information that is later synthesized with other 
intelligence and developed into an actionable intelligence product) are considered to be 
state and local law enforcement issues (p. 6). On the other hand, Lowenthal writes that 
intelligence is defined in the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act as 
“national intelligence” (2009, pp. 4–5), which is a federal law enforcement activity. 
According to the literature reviewed and the author’s knowledge and training on the 
subject, the time period for which intelligence gathering became a part of state and local 
policing efforts in the United States began in the early 1900s (personal communication, 
Brian Gray, March 10, 2010, Peterson, Morehouse, & Wright, 2002, p. 3). More recently, 
the gathering of information has been directed toward obtaining terrorism-related 
intelligence (International Association of Chiefs of Police [IACP] National Law 
Enforcement Policy Center, 2003b, p. 1). Although progress is being made, much debate 
still continues with regard to the access of federally collected crime- and terrorism-related 
information by state and local law enforcements professionals. 
The literature review related to ILP reveals that it is a relatively new concept in 
the United States. The ILP sources evaluated range from governmental documents at the 
federal, state, and local level to academia and individual experts. The assessed literature 
generally discusses ILP as a process, very similar to the intelligence cycle, that is broken 
down into six categories: 1) planning & direction; 2) collection; 3) processing and 
collation; 4) analysis; 5) dissemination; and 6) reevaluation (Peterson, 2005, pp. 6–7, 
Peterson, Morehouse, & Wright, 2002, pp. 79–118, USDOJ, BJA, 2005, p. 3). Some of 
the literature reviewed focuses on one or more aspects of the ILP process (e.g., collection 
and/or dissemination) rather than the ILP process as a whole.  
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What is ILP? There are a few events and published documents that appear to have 
been the catalyst for the push to implement ILP in the United States. In 2002, at a 
Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit hosted by the International Association of Chiefs 
of Police (IACP), summit participants defined ILP as “the collection and analysis of 
information to produce an intelligence end product designed to inform law enforcement 
decision making at both the tactical and strategic levels” (USDOJ, BJA, 2005, pp. 3–4). 
However, according to David Carter and Jeremy Carter, there is no “universally accepted 
definition” of ILP (2009, p. 315). To illustrate this point, the research reveals that other 
police practitioners and scholars define ILP as an approach built upon the tactics of 
various policing models like community-oriented policing (COP) (Carter, 2004, p. 41–
44; Loyka, Faggiani, & Karchmer, 2005, p. 8; Peterson, Morehouse, & Wright, 2002, p. 
13–16) and as a collaborative philosophy (Fuentes, 2006, p. 3). According to a Bureau of 
Justice Assistance (2005) report, the difference between COP, problem-oriented policing 
(POP), and ILP, is that ILP provides a “strategic intelligence analysis” whereas COP and 
POP operate on more of a tactical/operational level by providing a statistical analysis of a 
specific incident (Peterson, 2005, p. 11). 
Regardless of the definition used, the creators of the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security believe that ILP enhances situational awareness within communities. 
The strategy therefore calls upon members of the law enforcement community to 
implement ILP practices within their respective agencies (Homeland Security Council, 
2007, pp. 19–20). Additionally, ILP advocates like Jerry Ratcliffe and David Carter 
believe that ILP is not another buzzword with “business operating as usual,” nor is it to 
be relegated to a simple information clearinghouse within an organization (Ratcliffe, 
2002, p. 61; Carter, 2004, p. 41). Although ILP has a different meaning depending upon 
the end user, the literature reviewed suggests that ILP serves a purpose in this new era of 
policing (USDOJ, n.d., p. 1) and that purpose is to proactively set out to prevent the loss 
of lives and property. 
There are other events and publications that also appear to be catalysts for the 
recent shift to ILP and the formalization of its processes. During a 2002 IACP Criminal 
Intelligence Sharing Summit, law enforcement and intelligence experts came to the 
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realization that improvements must be made in their information-gathering, intelligence 
production, and information-sharing efforts (USDOJ, BJA, 2005, p. iii). In December 
2003, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) hosted an intelligence and 
information-sharing session attended by law enforcement executives from all levels of 
government. According to Loyka, Faggiani, and Karchmer, the attendees recognized that 
reliable intelligence is the most effective weapon in the fight against terrorism. However, 
the authors also noted a problem in that the executive session attendees did not clearly 
understand the differences between “information” and “intelligence” because they used 
the two terms interchangeably during the PERF session (2005, p. 10).  
The available information related to the collection and dissemination or sharing of 
information throughout the various law enforcement entities is limited and relatively new. 
All sources evaluated stem from federal, state, and local governmental entities. The 
material reviewed in this subcategory is found to support the use of a suspicious activity 
report (SAR) and the development of an information-sharing environment (ISE) among 
all law enforcement agencies and other homeland security professionals in order to 
facilitate the sharing of information. The research also reveals the existence of multiple 
information-sharing platforms currently in use by various law enforcement agencies. At 
least two of these platforms lack the interface capabilities to share information (personal 
communication, Robert Fund, October 2, 2009). 
 11
III. TRANSITION TO INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING 
The California law enforcement community, in recognizing their role in homeland 
security, must continue to evolve from the reaction/prevention policing models of 
previous eras (i.e., professional and community-oriented policing (COP)) to newer and 
more robust models that focus on prevention and prediction (i.e., COP & ILP) in order to 
support a more cooperative, collaborative, and cohesive approach to policing.  
Terrorism is not just a federal issue, it is also a local issue. The nexus between 
crime—a local issue—and acts of terrorism—a federal issue—is the fact that most 
terrorists are criminals. In many instances terrorists commit criminal acts in support of 
their mission (i.e., identity theft, selling stolen property), and local officers are in the best 
position to detect and disrupt that mission. Additionally, terrorists at some point become 
part of a local community, even if for a short time, in order to prepare for and carry out 
their mission. Although their activities may not raise any suspicion, they may still come 
to the attention of law enforcement, and a document may be created (i.e., incident report, 
traffic citation, field interview card) that links to an investigation elsewhere. Moreover, 
state and local law enforcement executives throughout the United States have urged 
federal authorities to recognize and fundamentally alter their view of state and local 
government by recognizing the significant role of their officers in the fight against 
terrorism (Major Cities Chiefs Association, Homeland Security Committee, 2008, p. 1). 
Furthermore, recent research reveals that police tactics such as the crime prevention and 
disruption efforts used by local officers on a daily basis are effective in combating 
terrorists organizations—especially those organizations refusing to recognize nonviolent 
tactics (Jones & Libicki, 2008, pp. xiii–11). For instance, beat officers and agency 
intelligence officers are very familiar with their operational environment. They know 
who and what belongs in the area and those people and things—such as cars—that are 
out of place. Local intelligence officers and detectives can use various means in order to 
penetrate a criminal organization and gain valuable information in the process. It would 
take years for someone from outside the area to develop this capability.  
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A. SCOPE 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore all the distinctions and similarities 
of the various policing models and programs used throughout the years. However, it is 
beneficial to have some understanding of the past in order to evaluate the status of 
policing today—and where it will be in the future. This chapter discusses the evolution of 
policing strategies from the political era to what I call the era of hometown security. 
B. EVOLUTION OF POLICING STRATEGIES—PAST TO PRESENT 
The law enforcement community within the United States has adopted many 
programs and policing strategies throughout the last several decades that are meant to 
help prevent and reduce the occurrence of crime. According to Samuel Walker, the 
temperance movement in the early 1930s frustrated governmental officials due to law 
enforcement’s inability to stop criminal acts related to violations of the Eighteenth 
Amendment (Prohibition of Intoxicating Liquors). As a result, in May 1929, President 
Hoover tasked Attorney General George Wickersham with conducting the first 
comprehensive national assessment of law and order in the United States. The resulting 
documents released from 1931 to 1932 failed to identify the weakness of a 
compartmentalized criminal justice framework, and by the end of 1933 the Eighteenth 
Amendment was repealed (Walker, 1978, pp. 1–11). The predominant policing strategies 
used from the 1840s until the early 1930s—a time referred to by some scholars as the 
“political era”—include legitimacy obtained through the local political establishment; 
intimate relationships between police and citizens, and police and politicians; crime 
control and prevention efforts using foot patrol and tortured confessions; political 
information gathering; broadly defined areas of responsibility to include social services; 
and operating within a centralized organization with decentralized decision-making 
powers (Kelling & Moore, 1988, pp. 2–4). What these policing strategies lacked were 
interdisciplinary cooperation and a coordinated enforcement effort, along with effective 




toward police professionalism by setting more stringent hiring standards, the 
development of criminal justice undergraduate degree programs, and the creation of the 
FBI National Training Academy. 
In another major study of the criminal justice system conducted in the mid to late 
1960s—another outcropping from the people’s frustration with the criminal justice 
system—the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 
set out to determine the reasons why the system was unable to thwart certain forms of 
corruption and criminal behavior in areas involving big businesses, the mob, and political 
figures. Unlike the Wickersham report, President Johnson’s commissioned report 
identifies the intricacies and impacts the actions of police, courts, and corrections on one 
another (Kelling & Wycoff, 2001, p. 4 (section 2)). According to West’s Encyclopedia of 
American Law (2005), the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, 
more widely known as the Wickersham Commission, published reports in 1931 and 1932 
in which a host of issues were identified that eventually led to a series of court decisions 
intended to rein in police abuse and misconduct (i.e., Mapp v. Ohio (1961), Escobedo v. 
Illinois (1964), Miranda v. Arizona (1966)).  
The degradation of police-community relationships resulting from riots and racial 
tension also occurred in the 60s (Walker, 1978, pp. 3–5), as did the practice of social 
distancing between police officers and the community (Kelling & Moore, 1988, pp. 5–8). 
In stark contrast to the strategies of the 1840s to early 1930s, the predominant policing 
strategies used in the 1930s to 1970s—a time scholars that refer to as the reform or 
professional era—included legitimacy obtained through enforcement of criminal laws; 
detached relationships between officers and citizens; attempts to insulate officers from 
politicians; crime control and prevention through the use of directed patrol and rapid 
response to calls; centrally dispatched calls for service; narrowing of the police function 
to address serious crime problems with the elimination of social services–related work; 
and police operation within a centralized organization with little decision-making powers 
(Kelling & Moore, 1988, pp. 5–9)—although there is some debate among police experts 
and scholars regarding the latter. The problems of the 1840s to 1930s are not solely 
related to the familiarity between police officers and citizens, but a notable shift in 
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police/community relations occurred during the 1960s. What the policing strategies 
during the reform period lacked were a coordinated and collaborative enforcement effort 
between police agencies, the integration of intelligence into their operations, and 
meaningful external accountability measures. 
The revitalization of previous policing strategies reemerged in the late 1970s, 
resulting in the implementation of policing programs designed to reestablish 
police/community relations (Walker, 1978, p. 5). According to Edward Flynn, a “quiet 
revolution” began in the 1980s, in which emerging ideologies like the “broken windows 
theory” of James Wilson and George Kelling caught the attention of the law enforcement 
community (2004, pp. 26–27). By 1993, Herman Goldstein had gained ground with his 
philosophy that law enforcement efforts alone cannot solve the crime problem, as 
evidenced by the increasing violent crime rate (Flynn, 2004, pp. 28–29). One 
predominate policing strategy to emerge as a result of the work done by Wilson, Kelling, 
Goldstein, and many others is community-oriented policing, otherwise known as COP. In 
some respects, policing had come full circle. According to George Kelling and Mark 
Moore, the predominate policing strategies occurring during this time they refer to as the 
“community problem solving era” include broadening of roles and responsibilities to 
include social and educational programs; greater focus on prevention rather than simply 
quick response times; close relationships with neighborhood community groups and 
business leaders; emphasis on information sharing and gathering within the agency; and 
decentralized decision making with increased support and participation from 
management and agency executives. Police legitimacy is now an amalgamation of the 
political and reform eras, coupled with the establishment of checks and balances derived 
from civil service protections, unionization, and the overall professionalization of police 
organizations (Kelling & Moore, 1988, pp. 10–14).  
How have these various models affected the crime rate in the United States and 
California up to this point? Table 1 provides a snapshot of the violent crime and property 




Table 1.   Comparison of California and U.S. Violent Crime and Property Crime, 
1960–1992 
 
Source: Office of Justice Programs, 2009 
One can infer from the information listed in Table 1 above that the various 
policing strategies practiced between 1960 and 1990 had little to no effect on the 
disruption, suppression, or prevention of violent crime. In addition, both violent crime 
and property crime in California exceeded the overall crime rate in the United States as a 
whole. The crime comparison between California and that of the United States is 
important because two of the police reform leaders, August Vollmer and Orlando W. 
Wilson, have ties to California: thus it is difficult for California police executives to say 
they were unaware of these new police practices and therefore did not try them or did not 
implement them. However, studies conducted between 1972 and 1997 of police 
effectiveness and the impact of police practices on the crime rate/level yielded mixed 
results. Some police scholars believe that police activities have had no impact on the 
crime rate (Bayley, 1996, p. 40), whereas others believe they have (Kelling, 1996, p. 31, 
Bratton, 1997, p. 29). According to Robert Heaton, some studies do suggest that the use  
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of intelligence tactics (i.e., physical and technology-driven surveillance and development 
and use of informants) positively affects the crime rate (2000, pp. 337–54). The impact of 
intelligence tactics is discussed later in the chapter. 
A major shift in police practices occurred as a result of the Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 that provided the money and legislative push for the 
law enforcement community to continue and further strengthen its migration from the 
reform policing era into an era I will call community-oriented policing. According to an 
article of the National Institute of Justice, the COP program had four specific goals: 1) to 
hire more officers; 2) to focus on problem-solving and interact with the community more; 
3) to be innovative; and 4) to develop new technologies to assist in reducing crime and its 
consequences (Roth & Ryan, 2000, p. 1).  
The COP philosophy relies heavily on the positive relationships that officers 
develop within their community-oriented police enforcement area, otherwise known as 
their “beat area.” Through the program, which is built upon a relationship of trust and 
respect, officers can elicit help, as well as information, from the people and business 
owners within their beat area by asking them to become stakeholders in area crime 
prevention and problem-solving efforts. This is important because studies have shown 
that most crime is solved, not by police efforts, but because the victim named the 
perpetrator or an informant provided the suspect’s name (Heaton, 2000, pp. 340–43).  
Problem-oriented policing takes COP to the next level, requiring officers to 
conduct a more in-depth analysis of community problems and then develop a corrective 
solution based upon that analysis. The analysis process, called “SARA” (Scanning, 
Analyzing, Responding, and Assessing) is used to assist officers in their identification of 
the root cause of a community problem. Prior to September 11, 2001, the COP 
philosophy was thought to be an effective public safety strategy because it required 
officers to take a more proactive, instead of reactive, approach in their crime prevention 
efforts (Kerlikowske, 2004, pp. 6–8). However, since September 11, some law 




transition from a community policing model to that of a “domestic security model” 
(IACP, 2005, p. ii). The status of COP in California, and in the United States in general, 
is discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV. 
Roughly the same time that the COP program began to take shape in the United 
States, New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton was in the process of 
implementing another model of policing known as “Compstat.” Police Commissioner 
Bratton wrote an article published by the Institute of Economic Affairs entitled “Crime Is 
Down in New York City: Blame the Police,” in which he attributed the sharp decline in 
crime in the early 1990s to this new policing model (Bratton, 1997, p. 29). Although what 
the “Compstat” acronym actually stands for is up for debate, the tenets of this policing 
model include data collection, analysis of crime trends, maps and statistics, and stringent 
accountability measures for command staff. The collected data is analyzed and an 
analysis product is produced for use by police commanders, managers, and supervisors to 
assist them in targeting crime problems within their areas of control in an expeditious 
manner (Willis, Mastrofski, & Weisburd, 2003, pp. v–2). Compstat differs from the 
problem-oriented policing program in that in the latter program officers work with 
community members to determine the root cause of the problem, and they work 
collaboratively with community members in addressing the problem. With Compstat, on 
the other hand, the supervisors are the ones held responsible for crime trends in their 
areas; some supervisors have responded to the added pressure on them by curtailing an 
officer’s discretion to address problems (Willis, Mastrofski, & Weisburd, 2003, p. vi), 
and some developed crime resolutions are made solely by the police (Scott, 2000, p. 104), 
thereby running the risk of weakening community partnerships. 
The strategic change that began to take shape in the United States after 
September 11—a time I refer to as the hometown security era—is still in its infancy 
stages. The transnational effect of crime, globalization, the free exchange and 
proliferation of information worldwide, and the relative ease of transportation affects all 
police jurisdictions in a similar manner, leaving any area vulnerable to attack. Therefore 
it is no longer appropriate for police executives to think that “it won’t happen here,” that 
traditional law enforcement practices are sufficient, or that the actions of their agency 
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have no impact on the crime-fighting efforts of other law enforcement agencies or 
homeland security professionals. As a result of the actions taken on September 11, 2001, 
some police executives now recognize the need to conform their current policing strategy 
more closely to that of a hometown security model, where they look outside their narrow 
span of control to determine the best methods to predict, prevent, respond to, and recover 
from crime, acts of terrorism, and natural disasters.  
During the 1990s, while COP, problem-oriented policing, and Compstat strategies 
were taking shape in the United States, ILP was being formally developed in Great 
Britain. The origins of ILP in Great Britain stem from the Kent Policing Model (Peterson, 
2005, p. 9) and the implementation of the National Intelligence Model in 2000 (Brown, 
2007, p. 336). By April 2003, the minimum standards of the National Intelligence Model 
(NIM) had been codified and applied to all police forces in England and Wales. The 
resulting collective effort in applying NIM assists police professions in the United 
Kingdom to combat crime and acts of terrorism with the development of an intelligence 
product they use to effectively “direct police activity” (CENTREX, n.d., pp. 2–3). 
However, unlike the uniform effort in the U.K., no legislative doctrine regarding the 
universal implementation and application of ILP exists in the United States. 
According to police scholars and practitioners, ILP in the United States is thought 
to be an approach built upon the tactics and practices of COP, problem-oriented policing, 
Compstat, and crime analysis (Carter, 2004, p. 44; Loyka, Faggiani, & Karchmer, 2005, 
p. 8;Peterson, Morehouse, & Wright, 2002, pp. 13–16). A Bureau of Justice Assistance 
report (2005), details the difference between COP, problem-oriented policing, and 
intelligence-led policing, where ILP is described as providing an intelligence product for 
decision-making to strategically address large-scale crime issues, in contrast to COP and 
problem-oriented policing, which are more tactically and operationally oriented to the 
statistical analysis of a single specific incident. The report goes on to recommend that law 
enforcement agencies integrate their problem-oriented policing and SARA functions into 
their ILP program (Peterson, 2005, pp. 11–12), and that they maintain a robust COP 
program because COP provides the mechanism that ILP needs for the collection of 
crime- and terrorism-related information. According to Graeme Newman and Ronald 
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Clarke, the tenets of ILP assist agencies in capitalizing on current police activities (i.e., 
patrol, enforcement of laws, and the collection, analysis, and synthesis of criminal 
information) in order to prevent crime rather than simply solving a crime after it has 
occurred (2008, p. Brief 23). 
C. EMPOWERING DOCUMENTS FOR ILP 
Homeland security professionals are known to misuse or use interchangeably the 
terms “information” and “intelligence” (Loyka, Faggiani, & Karchmer, 2005, p. 10; 
Peterson, 2005, p. 3). Therefore, before delving into the development of the use of 
intelligence and ILP in the United States, the definitions of various intelligence functions 
and components of the ILP processes pertinent to this thesis topic are discussed below.  
The definitions provided by the IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center 
include: 
 
 Information: “Raw data”; 
 Intelligence: “Reasoned conclusions, suppositions, and informed 
judgments based on a collection and analysis of reasonably reliable 
information”; 
 Criminal Intelligence: “Information compiled, analyzed and/or 
disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor criminal 
activity”; 
 Strategic Intelligence: “Information used to develop trends, indicators, 
forecasts and projections about criminal activity from various 
perspectives”; and 
 Tactical Intelligence: “Information regarding a specific criminal event that 
can be used immediately by operational units to further a criminal 
investigation, plan tactical operations and provide for officer safety.” 
(2003b, pp. 3–4) 
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During a 2002 Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit hosted by the IACP, summit 
participants defined ILP as “the collection and analysis of information to produce an 
intelligence end product designed to inform law enforcement decision making at both the 
tactical and strategic levels” (USDOJ, BJA, 2005, pp. 3–4). 
It is difficult to enhance the ILP process without first understanding what the 
process involves. Similar to the crime analysis process, the ILP process has six steps: 
planning and direction, collection, processing/collation, analysis, dissemination, and 
reevaluation (Peterson, 2005, pp. 6–7; Peterson, Morehouse, & Wright, 2002, pp. 79–
118; Gottlieb, Arenberg, & Singh, 1994, pp. 101–84; USDOJ, BJA, 2005, p. 3). Each 
step in the process may use different technology, have varying training and legal 
requirements, and involve different divisions, units, or bureaus. Marilyn Peterson (2005) 
provides a diagram and description of the intelligence process, a basic overview of which 
is given below: 
 Planning and Direction: Agency-defined outcomes that direct the scope 
of collection; collection is planned, focused, coordinated; guidelines 
prohibit illegal methods of information collection.  
 Collection: Raw data or information collected through the use of reports, 
citations, field interview (FI) cards, Internet searches, online database 
searches, surveillances, searches, citizen informants, confidential 
informants. 
 Processing/Collation: Sifting through raw data or information, usually 
through text-mining databases to eliminate irrelevant information. 
 Analysis: Converting, reviewing, indexing, and validating raw data or 
information into an intelligence product. 
 Dissemination: Presentation of a finished intelligence product to agency 
decision makers. This can be accomplished through the use of intelligence 
reports, intelligence bulletins, and so forth. The intelligence product may 
also be distributed to outside agencies and state and national law 
enforcement networks for those who have the need and the right to know. 
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 Reevaluation: Requesting feedback from the receiver of the intelligence 
product to determine its usefulness. This may also involve an audit tool 
used to track who received the report, when they received it, their reason 
for needing the report, and who released the report to them. (2005, pp. 6–
7) 
One of the primary uses of intelligence products, whether labeled military 
intelligence, national security intelligence, or criminal intelligence for police agencies, is 
to provide executive decision-makers with the necessary information to protect the lives 
and property of U.S. citizens. For more than a hundred years, the military has used 
intelligence products to make strategic and tactical resource and deployment decisions. 
According to Mark Lowenthal, national security–level intelligence capabilities began 
around the 1940s with the establishment of the Coordinator of Information followed by 
the Office of Strategic Services, and they became more solidified with the passage of the 
National Security Act in 1947, which provides the legal basis for what is known as the 
“Intelligence Community” (IC) (2009, pp. 1–19). Until the events of September 11, 16 
agencies were identified as members of the IC. After September 11, with the passage of 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act in 2004, the IC was expanded to 
include the newly established Department of Homeland Security. According to 
Lowenthal, one of the applications of intelligence at the national level is to counteract 
strategic acts of crime and terrorism (2009, pp. 2–3). The gathering of information for 
similar purposes by police agencies began when the New York police department sent 
officers from their Italian crime squad to Italy in the 1920s to collect intelligence on mob 
families (personal communication, Brian Gray, March 10, 2010). During Prohibition, 
police information-gathering efforts focused on the sale, transportation, and consumption 
of alcohol. Later, the gathering of information focused on Communist sympathizers, 
suspected Communist organizations, and organized crime operations. Most recently, the 
gathering of information by police agencies has been directed toward obtaining terrorism-
related intelligence (IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center, 2003b, p. 1). 
Although law enforcement agencies have practiced the gathering of information 
for future criminal intelligence purposes for many years, in the aftermath of September 
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11, law enforcement executives recognized a need to comprehensively reform their 
intelligence operations because they now recognized the dual imperative of gathering 
information related to all crimes, which includes suspicious activity that has a possible 
nexus to terrorism, rather than being narrowly focused on traditional crimes (Peterson, 
2005, p. vii) . For instance, at a 2002 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit, law 
enforcement and intelligence experts concluded that improvements had to be made in 
their information gathering, intelligence production, and information-sharing efforts 
(USDOJ, BJA, 2005, p. iii). An IACP report also indicates that police and intelligence 
experts alike support the tenets of ILP and that they recognize the need for non-federal 
law enforcement agencies to be partners in and the driving force behind the criminal 
intelligence process (2002, pp. i–1). The 2002 IACP summit participants also 
acknowledged the lack of a coordinated effort or national doctrine related to the criminal 
intelligence process (2002, p. 5) and therefore recommended the creation of legislation in 
support of a “national intelligence plan” (2002, p. 19).  
In response to requests made by the 2002 IACP summit participants, a Global 
Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) was 
formed. The newly formed working group developed a National Criminal Intelligence 
Sharing Plan (NCISP) to guide the intelligence efforts of homeland security 
professionals, regardless of the size of their agencies, and assist those professionals in 
their public-safety efforts. The GIWG participants envisioned that the NCISP would 
provide agencies with: 
 A model intelligence-sharing plan; 
 A mechanism to promote intelligence-led policing; 
 A blueprint for law enforcement administrators to follow when enhancing 
or building an intelligence system; 
 A model for intelligence process principles and policies; 
 A plan that respects and protects individuals’ privacy and civil rights; 
 A technology architecture to provide secure, seamless sharing of 
information among systems; 
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 A national model for intelligence training; 
 An outreach plan to promote timely and credible intelligence sharing; 
 A plan that leverages existing systems and networks, yet allows flexibility 
for technology and process enhancements. (USDOJ, BJA, 2005, pp. iii–iv) 
In December 2003, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) hosted an 
intelligence and information-sharing session attended by law enforcement executives 
from all levels of government. According to Loyka, Faggiani, & Karchmer, attendees at 
the forum determined reliable intelligence products to be the most effective weapon in 
the fight against terrorism (2005, p. 1). As noted in another report prepared by the IACP, 
in 2004, law enforcement executives realized that “for the first time since World War II, 
policing is being conducted, domestically, in a time of war; [and] the United States faces 
a foreign threat within its own borders” (2005, p. 9). Therefore, in 2004, a project 
intended to assist the law enforcement community in adapting to and managing its 
changing police environment was begun. The project group included executive members 
of various law enforcement associations, a national police organization, and the Police 
Foundation. These agency executives participated in surveys and roundtable discussions 
to address how the law enforcement community could effectively navigate the new 
policing environment that included an element of terrorism. As the 2002 summit 
participants and members of the GIWG had two years previously, the 2004 IACP 
executive working group also identified the development of state and local agency 
intelligence units and ILP as promising practices (IACP, 2005, p. 5). In fact, 86 percent 
of the executives responding to the survey reported a change in their operations due to the 
threat of terrorism within the United States (2005, p. 17), and 41 percent identified a 
policy or program change with regard to their information and intelligence-sharing 
efforts. However, only one of the 164 responding agencies specifically mentioned ILP 
(2005, p. 29). The fact that only one agency mentioned ILP is significant since the 
research of this thesis reveals that ILP had been identified as a promising crime-fighting 
initiative in Canada in the early 1990s (Smith, 1997, pp. 17–20), in the U.K. by 1993 
(Robertson, 1997, pp. 21–23, Anderson, 1997, pp. 5–7), and in the United States by 1997 
(Peterson, 2005, p. 23). It should be noted, however, that at least one police professional  
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believes that agencies employing Compstat principles and members of the High Intensity 
Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) are using processes consistent with the ILP policing 
models (Porter, 1997, pp. 28–29). 
In 2007, President Bush officially supported the efforts of those law enforcement 
executives who began transforming their intelligence operations with his 2007 National 
Strategy for Homeland Security, in which he called upon law enforcement agencies to 
increase their situational awareness of the communities they serve using ILP (Homeland 
Security Council, 2007, pp. 19–20). Although President Obama’s 2010 National Security 
Strategy does not specifically refer to ILP, the strategy does identify the gathering, 
analysis, and exchange of information/intelligence as our best defense against crime and 
terrorism (President of the United States [POTUS], 2010, pp. 19–20).  
Although there is no universally accepted definition of ILP (Carter & Carter, 
2009, p. 315), one definition describes ILP as an approach built upon the tactics of 
various policing models like COP (Carter, 2004, pp. 41–44; Loyka, Faggiani, & 
Karchmer, 2005, p. 8; Peterson, Morehouse, & Wright, 2002, pp. 13–16). Even though 
ILP has many meanings, it serves a purpose in this new era of policing (USDOJ, n.d., p. 
1), because, when implemented correctly, ILP transitions police services to a more 
preventive, rather than reactive, model of policing, by providing law enforcement 
executives with actionable intelligence products for sound decision making, strategic 
targeting, and efficient resource allocation in order to prevent crime and acts of terrorism 
(Home Office, 2005, p. 7).  
The next two chapters of this thesis focus on aspects of the collection (Chapter 
IV) and analysis (Chapter V) steps of ILP, both of which are critically important since 
without the gathering of and access to all potential crime- and terrorism-related 
information, law enforcement agencies cannot hope to save lives or protect people and 
property by detecting and preventing crime and acts of terrorism. The next chapter 
compares the COP efforts of American law enforcement agencies with those within the 
United Kingdom since research reveals that the tenets of COP are key elements of an 
officer’s ability to solicit, collect, and share suspicious activity and crime-related 
information. 
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IV. A COMPARISON OF COP IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Law enforcement officials now recognize the value of the intelligence cycle and 
the resulting product—reliable intelligence (e.g., the detailed analysis, evaluation and 
interpretation of information)—as the most effective weapon in our fight against 
terrorism (Loyka, Faggiani, & Karchmer, 2005, pp. 1–7). Additionally, former 
Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff called upon citizens to 
become engaged in homeland security efforts by becoming active crime-fighting partners 
with the police (United States Department of Homeland Security [USDHS], 2005, pp. 1–
4). Furthermore, the National Security Strategy recognizes the dual imperative of 
empowering and engaging communities and the intelligence cycle as our best defense 
against crime and terrorism (POTUS, 2010, pp. 19–20). ILP is the framework to address 
the intelligence need; however, it requires a cohesive and collaborative police/community 
partnership—the basis of the COP philosophy—to be truly effective in preventing crime 
and saving lives. Therefore, it stands to reason that a strong COP program—with its 
benefits of community engagement and joint ownership of crime problems and 
solutions—provides the mechanism that ILP needs for the collection of crime- and 
terrorism-related information, which, when combined with other information, may 
provide actionable intelligence leading to the prevention of crime and acts of terrorism. 
A. SCOPE 
This chapter compares the state and local government structure within California, 
focusing on the county and local law enforcement community. The data set is particularly 
accessible given the author’s role and familiarity with California law enforcement and its 
structural similarity to police services in England and Wales. This chapter addresses the 
level of community-oriented program implementation in the California and English and 
Welsh law enforcement communities and the level of accountability imposed upon law 
enforcement agencies with regard to their COP efforts. 
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Table 2 provides the reader with a quick logistical and demographical comparison 
between California and England and Wales. 
Table 2.   Demographic Comparison of California and England/Wales 
 
Sources: (1) League of California Cities, 2010; (2) Ibid.; (3) Reaves, 2007, p. 11; (4) 
League of California Cities, 2010; (5) Reaves, 2007, p. 10; (6) Ibid., pp. 10–11; (7) 
California Commission on Peace Officer Standards & Training, 2009; (8) Office for 
National Statistics, 2009; (9) Wikipedia, 2010; (10) Sigurdsson & Mulchandani, 2010, p. 
1; (11) Ibid., pp. 1–4. 
B. U.S. IMPLEMENTATION  
Elements of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 
provided the incentive for the law enforcement community to migrate from the 
professional policing era into what some call the era of community-oriented policing. 
According to an article of the National Institute of Justice, the COP program had four 
specific goals; however, the federal government gave individual agencies the latitude to 
implement their own policies, programs, and procedures in order to reach those goals 
(Roth & Ryan, 2000, pp. 1–3). As a result, 47 different tactics are identified as being a 
part of the COP philosophy prior to 2002 (Roth & Ryan, 2000, p. 16). By 2002, there 
were at least 56 different COP tactics employed (Cordner, 2004, p. 61). Although there 
are variations in how COP is practiced amongst the various policing entities, these 
variations share a fundamental commonality: the development of strong police and 
community partnerships/relationships. 
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Regardless of the efforts of COP proponents and the Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the COP philosophy is not fully embraced by all police 
executives in the United States. In 1992, only 20 percent of the agencies polled had 
implemented COP, and a mere 58 percent had implemented it by 1997 (Fridell, 2004b, 
p. 41). However, due to self-reporting concerns surrounding the survey methods used in 
1992, 1997, and later in 2002, the extent to which one can accurately assess the level of 
COP philosophy implementation among U.S. law enforcement agencies is limited.  
Although police executives find rising crime rates or the public perception of 
rising crime rates to be problematic, there are no real incentives for them to migrate to a 
more community-focused policing style because the rising crime alone does not “threaten 
their survival,” as does abuse under the color of authority committed by their officers 
(Kelling, Wasserman, & Williams, 1988, p. 1). For instance, some police executives in 
the United States express concern that the COP philosophy, once implemented, could 
lead to police corruption and abuse. A counterargument expressed in “Police 
Accountability and Community Policing,” indicates that the tenets of community policing 
afford police managers “additional opportunities for … maintenance and accountability” 
of their officers (Kelling, Wasserman, & Williams, 1988, p. 7). Additionally, the report 
states that a militaristic, top-down command and control approach to managing law 
enforcement agencies and their people tends to make officers feel that they are being 
treated as wayward, minimally skilled employees, rather than as professional, creative, 
and productive problem solvers committed to the communities they serve (Kelling, 
Wasserman, & Williams, 1988, p. 2). As a result, this managerial style may cause officers 
to align themselves with other officers—even corrupt and abusive ones—rather than fully 
supporting the organization and communities they serve.  
Kelling, Wasserman, and Williams suggest three viable alternates for police 
executives who use the COP philosophy to manage their people: 1) values-based 
leadership derived from laws, the Constitution, and highest professional norms; 2) 
community accountability though the use of community relations units and civilian 
review boards; and 3) the use of administrative controls (i.e., supervision, training, audits, 
surveys, discipline, rewards, and peer control) (1988, pp. 3–7). In essence, clearly 
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communicated organizational values, along with written policies and procedures to guide 
and inform both officers and community members, linked to administrative control 
mechanisms like those listed above, allow officers to apply their own ideas and solutions 
to problems instead of merely following the rules (Kelling, Wasserman, & Williams, 
1988, pp. 3–4). This decisional empowerment of frontline law enforcement officers 
affords them the opportunity to collaborate with business and community members in 
order to solve problems, which in turn enhances police/community trust, respect, and 
confidence. This police/community partnership may also lead to a feeling of “mutual 
accountability” and citizen resiliency where community members recognize that they too 
are responsible for their own safety. As the intellectual founder of COP, Sir Robert Peel, 
once said, “The police are the public and the public are the police” (Fridell, 2004b, p. 4). 
In addition to the lack of incentive, and the fact that there is no definitive concept 
of COP in the United States, Jeffrey Roth and Joseph Ryan surmise that the COP 
program will either succeed by achieving its objective, the objective will be altered to fit 
the organization’s culture, or it will “fizzle out” (2000, p. 19). 
Where is the COP program now in California? According to Brian Reaves and 
Matthew Hickman, 91 California sheriff’s and police departments responded to a 
nationwide Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) 
survey conducted in 2000. The response of 91 agencies represented a 23% participation 
rate by California law enforcement agencies. Only 89 agencies answered a series of 
questions regarding community policing plans, training, and programs questions, 
representing only 22% of all law enforcement agencies in California. Although a limited 
sampling, the results demonstrate that only 61 agencies (69%) have a formal COP plan; 
however, 5 of those 61 respondents (8%) also indicated that their officers do not receive 
community policing training. Fifty-seven agencies (64%) indicated that they have full-
time personnel assigned to a special COP unit, 19 agencies (21%) have designated COP 
personnel when needed, and 8 agencies (9%) have COP policies, but no personnel 
designated to perform this task (Reaves & Hickman, 2004, pp. 109–110). In the next 
series of COP-related questions, all but one agency provided responses, leaving a 
response pool of 90 agencies. An analysis of these response results reveals that only 64% 
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of responding agencies in California participate in problem-solving partnerships, only 
48% conduct citizen surveys, 99% participate in community group meetings, and 78% 
actively encourage officer problem-solving projects. Of the 70 agencies that actively 
encourage officer problem-solving projects, 25 (36%) do not document this information 
in an annual performance appraisal (Reaves & Hickman, 2004, pp. 121–22). Failure to 
document this type of activity in an annual performance appraisal does two things: First, 
it demonstrates that the department does not think the activity is an important employee 
performance measurement tool. Second, it allows for the indiscriminant implementation 
of officer-initiated problem-solving projects involving citizen input, which is an 
important community partnership/ownership building activity.  
How do these results from the year 2000 compare to other agencies in the United 
States? Lorie Fridell (2004), on behalf of the Police Executive Research Forum, analyzed 
three national COP surveys involving U.S. police agencies in general. According to 
Fridell, the 2002 survey results indicate that 80% of responding agencies work with 
citizens to identify and address problems, approximately 70% employ citizen surveys to 
determine area needs and priorities, and less than 80% use citizen surveys to evaluate 
their police services (Fridell, 2004b, pp. 49–54). Gary Cordner’s analysis of the three 
national surveys reveals that community involvement in community policing actually 
declined in 2002 when compared to the 1997 survey results (Fridell, 2004b, p. 64). 
However, as with the California component of the 2000 LEMAS survey, one must be 
careful in placing too much emphasis on these survey results because of the limitations of 
the survey data and the fact that the survey data relied on agencies to accurately self-
report.  
In an attempt to further assess the commitment to community partnerships within 
local California law enforcement agencies, this author conducted a random sampling of 
California police and sheriff’s websites. Of the 43 websites assessed, only 77% mention 
their commitment to community partnerships. Essentially, a brief notation is made within 




“in partnership with the community.” Additionally, only one website notes that the 
agency has have a “community/law enforcement partnership program,” and the agency 
website actually identifies the members of the program and how to contact them. 
How one measures the success of COP as a crime prevention and reduction 
strategy for a measurement tool seems as nebulous as the concept itself. According to 
Roth and Ryan, during the fourth year of COP implementation, the net effect of COP 
tactics on reducing crime were found to be immeasurable (2000, p. 20). In reviewing 
another comprehensive COP performance study sponsored by the Police Executive 
Research Forum, entitled “Community Policing: The Past, Present and Future,” COP 
supporters skirt the issue of whether or not COP tactics actually reduce crime. In addition 
to Ryan and Roth’s observations in 2000, Darrell Stephens (2004) wrote, “There remains 
a wide gap that precludes linking crime-fighting strategies and tactics to the outcome of 
reduction in crime” (2004, p. 203).  
How does one measure the performance and effectiveness of California law 
enforcement agencies? California law enforcement agencies and their individual 
members are held accountable by a court of law or the attorney general—and to some 
extent by either city councils, grand juries, police commissions, boards of supervisors, 
various unions, and civilian review boards. However these entities focus on real or 
perceived abuses, instead of substantive issues like service delivery, public confidence, 
crime reduction, and addressing neighborhood concerns. According to Robert Heaton, 
some researchers even question whether or not police and their activities positively 
impact crime (2000, pp. 342–351). 
C. UNITED KINGDOM IMPLEMENTATION 
According to the Home Office Crime Reduction webpage, the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998 provides the legal impetus for the police to tackle area crime through 
police/community partnerships (Home Office, 2003). Since 1998, all of the 43 police 
forces throughout England and Wales have made neighborhood policing practices central 
to how they address crime and community concerns (Home Office, 2005, p. 2). Part 1, 
chapter 1, sections 5 & 6 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 direct the police to elicit 
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the views of and input from the public as they formulate and implement strategies to 
address crime and disorder (Office of Public Section Information [OPSI], 1998). In 
addition, since implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act, several other legislative 
and policy documents have been written and implemented, each with a citizen-focused 
approach to policing. These items include “Involving Your Community: Working to 
Reduce Crime,” by Andy Boys and Frank Warburton (n.d.), “Police Reform Act 2002: 
The Policing Plan (Amendment) Regulations 2010,” and from the Home Office, 
“Neighbourhood Policing: Your Police; Your Community; Our Commitment” (2005), 
“From the Neighbourhood to the National: Policing Our Communities Together” 
(2008b), “Cutting Crime A New Partnership 2008–11” (2007a), “National Community 
Safety Plan 2008–11” (2007b), “Saving Lives. Reducing Harm. Protecting the Public. An 
Action Plan for Tackling Violence 2008–11” (2008c), “Saving Lives. Reducing Harm. 
Protecting the Public, An Action Plan for Tackling Violence 2008–11 One Year On” 
(2009a), and “Protecting the Public: Supporting the Police to Succeed” (2009b).  
As one may surmise, the police forces in the United Kingdom have made 
fundamental and strategic changes in their approach to and implementation of COP. The 
paradigm shift to COP in the United Kingdom, termed “neighbourhood policing,” is 
apparent throughout all 43 police forces within England and Wales (Home Office, 2005, 
p. 5). Community members living and working in the England/Wales police service areas 
enjoy responsive “neighbourhood policing teams.” These policing teams are made up of 
police officers, special constables, community support officers, and other volunteers 
(Home Office, 2005, p. 2). As the information in Table 2 demonstrates, there are an 
estimated 57% fewer law enforcement officers (full-time and reserve) to combat crime 
and address community concerns per 1,000 population in California compared to the 
number of neighborhood police team members available in England and Wales. This 
difference may be more significant when including community service officers (CSOs) in 
the equation; however, that particular information for California is not readily available. 
Clearly, the law enforcement community in the United Kingdom has been 
transformed over the last several years as a result of new legislation (i.e., Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998 and Police Reform Act 2002). Moreover, the nationwide strategic 
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effort with the development of “neighbourhood policing,” the adherence to the “policing 
pledge” (Home Office, 2008b, pp. 20–34), and the development of a three-year “national 
community safety plan” each year, as well as the “police report cards,” have begun to 
solidify the United Kingdom’s citizen-focused policing model. The principal guiding 
document that outlines the nationwide governmental approach to policing is found in the 
green paper entitled, “From the Neighbourhood to the National: Policing Our 
Communities Together.”  
In addition, the U.K. police forces take their neighborhood policing efforts one 
step further in that they believe it “must be intelligence led” (Home Office, 2005, p. 7). 
To the same degree that the “neighbourhood policing” program was implemented, the 
“national intelligence model” (NIM) has also been implemented throughout the United 
Kingdom. The NIM provides the framework for use by police forces with regard to their 
information and intelligence operations, as well as the key to developing a proactive 
crime-fighting neighborhood policing program (Home Office, 2005, p. 7). The statutory 
basis of NIM is outlined in a Home Office National Centre for Policing Excellence report 
entitled, “Code of Practice National Intelligence Model.” According to this report, the 
Home Secretary has the authority to issue codes of practice that must be adhered to by all 
police forces in England and Wales, the police authorities, and other crime and 
intelligence services and authorities as identified in the Police Act 1996, Police Act 1997, 
and the Police Reform Act 2002 (CENTREX, n.d., p. 2). CENTREX also published a 
report to assist agencies in their intelligence process efforts. The CENTREX report 
indicates that ILP “underpins all aspects of policing” and that NIM is a business model to 
be followed by the police services (2007, p. 3 & 6). 
In contrast to the U.S. survey results, the British model of policing focuses on the 
needs and expectations of its citizens. In “The Review of Policing Final Report,” Sir 
Ronnie Flanagan wrote: 
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Policing is far too important to be left to the police alone. It is a public 
service and one that can only be effectively carried out with the support 
and consent of the public. Using and developing this engagement with the 
public is one of the most important challenges in modern policing and it is 
a challenge that must be met at all levels (2008, p. 5)  
Clearly, Flanagan’s statement demonstrates the importance that the British place 
on police/community partnerships. Another Home Office website concurs with Sir 
Flanagan’s statement, going so far as to state that community needs and expectations 
should “always [be] reflected in police decision-making and service” (Home Office 
Police, n.d.). 
In stark contrast to the lackluster websites assessed in California, of the 25 
England/Wales police force websites assessed, one hundred percent demonstrated a solid 
commit to the community partnership and accountability philosophy. Each website has a 
“Safer Neighbourhood” or “ My Neighbourhood” link where the “Neighbourhood 
Policing Teams” are identified by photograph and their contact information listed. 
Moreover, it is readily apparent after reviewing a majority of the England/Wales police 
force and police authority websites that they are committed to community accountability 
through the use of audits and various survey tools. More importantly, however, all of the 
websites indicate the level of public confidence that each police force has within the 
community it serves.  
Authorities in the United Kingdom place more emphasis on the level of 
community confidence brought about by the COP philosophy rather than the actual 
reduction in crime. However, one Home Office website did indicate that “partnerships 
between the police, local authorities, probation service, health authorities, the voluntary 
sector, and local residences and businesses” are effective in reducing crime and disorder 
(Home Office, 2008). The formation of these new partnerships is the result of a new 
program called the Crime & Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) program, which 
began as a result of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.  
In addition, this author’s review of a website operated by Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate Constabulary (HMIC)—Inspecting Policing in the Public Interest—indicates 
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that police forces must “account for what they do, and how well they are doing it” 
(O'Connor, n.d.). The website also contains a report, entitled “Assessing Police 
Performance: Giving the Public a Voice—Proposals for Consultation on Rounded 
Assessment,” in which a detailed account provides information on 36 police performance 
indicators within four major domains areas (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 
[HMIC], 2009, pp. 4–20). On March 11, 2010, HMIC’s department—Inspecting Policing 
in the Public Interest—published the most recent “police report card” for all 43 police 
forces in England and Wales. (HMIC, n.d.). This author’s review of the police report card 
reveals that the performance of all 43 police forces was rated in 15 subcategories 
covering three of the four major domains (i.e., local crime and policing, protection from 
serious harm, and confidence and satisfaction). The forth domain (value for money) 
contains four subcategories and lists a rating of low, low/medium, medium/high, or high 
for each subcategory. The ratings for each category are listed as either poor, fair, good, 
excellent, meeting standard, or exceeding standard. The “Local Crime & Policing” 
domain rates 42 of the agencies as having met the “neighbourhood policing” standard and 
one agency exceeded the standard. The “Confidence & Satisfaction” domain rates 35 of 
the agencies as “fair” and eight as “good” in meeting the “policing pledge.” In addition, 
33 of the agencies were rated “fair,” five were rated “poor,” and five were rated 
“good/excellent” with regard to the confidence of the public in their police force (HMIC, 
2010, pp. 1–5).  
Another system used to hold police forces accountable—known as the “tripartite 
partners,”—distributes police oversight responsibilities among the Home Office, Police 
Authorities, and the chief constable. In turn, the Home Office, Police Authorities, and the 
chief constable are held accountable to Parliament by the Home Secretary. The Home 
Secretary is able to establish goals and objectives, known as a “code of practice,” which 
is then detailed in the National Police Plan (Mawby & Wright, 2005, p. 4). 
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One possible reason that California law enforcement agencies have not fully 
embraced COP to the extent that the U.K. police forces have is because the government 
in the United Kingdom is more regional and centralized. The Home Office/Home 
Secretary provides the guidance for 43 police forces, whereas the 58 counties and 338 
local police agencies in California are decentralized and operate autonomously. If 
California law enforcement agencies intend to implement ILP, as suggested in the 2007 
National Strategy for Homeland Security, then they will need a more robust COP 
program. Like the U.K. policing model in England and Wales, California law 
enforcement agencies should assess the pros and cons of operating in a more regionalized 
fashion. Recently, a Los Angeles police executive acknowledged that a decentralized 
government poses both opportunities and challenges (Downing, 2009). One drawback of 
a decentralized form of government, as demonstrated in this chapter, is the inability to 
uniformly implement and sustain COP or ILP practices in California. California 
Constitution, article 11, sections 1(b) and 4(c) state that the legislature and county 
charters shall provide an elected sheriff (California State Senate, n/d). Since California 
sheriffs are “constitutional officers” elected by the people of each county, it is possible 
for the 338 municipal police departments to be absorbed within the authority of the 58 
county sheriffs. This regionalized approach will save money with the sharing of 
resources, increase the “unity of effort,” and increase the sharing of information and 
intelligence by reducing the number of organizational and informational stovepipes. 
In addition, California law enforcement agencies receive direction and guidance 
from several state and federal agencies such as the governor’s office, California Peace 
Officers Standard and Training; California Department of Justice; California attorney 
general’s office; U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Service; Department of Homeland Security; and the U.S. attorney general’s office, to 
name a few. Although California law enforcement agencies receive guidance and 
direction from these agencies, there is little to no measure of accountability with regard to 
sustaining the implementation of COP or ILP. Furthermore, although the attorney 
general’s office has the legal authority to audit and hold law enforcement agencies 
accountable, historically the attorney’s general’s office exerts this power when some 
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form of corruption, abuse, or negligence has been alleged, not because a certain service 
delivery method was not used. It is recommended that the attorney general’s office 
conduct routine annual audits of the various law enforcement agencies. This task would 
be significantly more manageable with a regionalized policing model—58 agencies 
versus 396—similar in scope to the accountability audits conducted by the HMIC in the 
United Kingdom. 
In summary, to be more coordinated and cohesive in their efforts to protect and 
serve Californians, the viability and potential for a more centralized law enforcement 
community similar to the policing model found in England and Wales must be explored 
further. Furthermore, California must fully embrace and implement the tenets of COP. 
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V. INFORMATION-SHARING SYSTEMS 
A 1999 Library of Congress research document titled “The Sociology and 
Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?” states that researchers 
believed then that al Qaeda would attack the United States by either bombing a federal 
building, using a nuclear suitcase bomb on various targets in Washington, D.C., or by 
crashing a plane into the one of the critical infrastructures in our nation’s capital 
(Hudson, 1999, p. 6). In the year 2000, 40 federal entities were awarded $10 billion to 
assist in their terrorism-related activities (United States General Accounting Office 
[GAO], 2000, p. 3). Although the government had warning, and billions allocated to 
combat terrorism, the United States was still attacked. The failure to synthesize and share 
information in a timely manner are contributing factors to our inability to prevent or 
disrupt such attacks.  
Therefore, it is crucial that the California law enforcement community learn from 
not only its own events, but also from lessons learned by other agencies in order to avoid 
repeating the same mistakes. For instance, the 9/11 Commission report identifies 
operational deficiencies within governmental agencies that may have contributed to the 
government’s failure to thwart the attacks of September 11, such as substandard 
information systems technology, the lack of effective intelligence collection processes, 
and the failure to share information (Kean, et al., 2004, pp. 76–79). One of the many 
recommendations identified by the 9/11 Commission to more effectively protect the 
homeland was the need for “unity of effort in sharing information” (Kean, et al, 2004, p. 
416). This chapter discusses the benefits of data-mining and the issue of sharing 
information, examines emerging computer systems that support the goal of information 
sharing among California law enforcement agencies, and considers how the California 
law enforcement community can better leverage its information-sharing efforts in order 
to enhance its ability to detect and prevent crime and terrorism. 
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A. DATA MINING AND INFORMATION SHARING 
Advancements in technology have facilitated the evolution of information from 
general data to crime and terrorism information that, when analyzed with other data and 
value-added information, can be developed into an actionable intelligence product used 
by law enforcement managers and executives in their strategic decision-making process 
of selecting an appropriate response (Willis, Mastrofski, & Weisburd, 2003, p. 1).  
Table 3 illustrates how data mining has evolved in the business industry, and one 
may infer that similar capabilities have evolved, and are continuing to evolve, within the 
law enforcement community as well. 
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Data mining as described by Kurt Thearling involves “the automated extraction of 
hidden predictive information from large databases” (Thearling, n.d.). In other words, 
analysts use various programs and systems as they sift through a plethora of stored data 
in order to identify current and future crime trends and patterns. The extracted 
information is then used by the analyst to develop an intelligence product for the police 
chief or management to direct their resources most effectively. For example, if the police 
chief wants to disrupt a series of burglaries in the downtown area, the analyst either 
builds a model or uses a previous model depicting a known and similar event. Some of 
the steps that analysts take in developing the model include researching dates, times, and 
locations of similar burglaries and noting similar characteristics from those past 
burglaries (i.e., types of items taken, methods and tools used for entry, entry and exit 
strategies, routes used, security measures in place). The model is developed using all the 
similar characteristics and is applied to the unknown string of burglaries in the downtown 
area. From this process, the analyst hopes to provide the police chief with an actionable 
intelligence product in which the analyst provides his recommendation about when, 
where, how, and possibly by whom, the next crime will occur. Using this intelligence 
product the police chief directs his limited resources with the intention of preventing 
another crime and possibly apprehending the individual committing the crimes. Although 
the above scenario is quite possible as described, the author acknowledges that many 
times a criminal footprint cannot be determined by data mining and analysis alone. One 
may still need to use other forms of information and intelligence gathering, such as 
confidential informants and signals intelligence (court ordered wire taps), in order to add 
value to the modeled information. 
Due to the transnational and globalized nature of crime and criminals, as well as 
terrorism and terrorists, in order to be most effective in combating crime and terrorism, 
the local law enforcement community must share its data not only throughout its own 
county, but throughout the state and with other states and federal agencies as well. 
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B. GLOBAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SHARING INITIATIVE 
As previously noted in Chapter I, a Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative 
(Global) Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) was formed at the request of the 2002 
IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit participants. The newly formed GIWG 
developed a national criminal intelligence sharing plan, which was meant to be used by 
local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement agencies, regardless of their size, to assist 
them in their public safety and information-sharing efforts (USDOJ, BJA, 2005, p. iii). 
According to the Bureau of Justice Assistance report, one outcome envisioned by the 
GIWG participants for the national criminal intelligence sharing plan was the “secure 
[and] seamless sharing of information among systems” (2005, p. iv). 
There are many governmental initiatives aimed at enhancing and improving 
information sharing. One such initiative is the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act (2004), Public Law 108-458, which mandates the sharing of information 
among governmental agencies (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. 49). In response to 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, the Department of Justice sought 
to transform its information-sharing efforts with federal, state, county, municipal, and 
tribal law enforcement entities with the development of the Law Enforcement 
Information Sharing Program (LEISP) strategy. LEISP is a policy framework—not an 
information system—that provides the guiding principles toward the movement of a 
“need to share” culture within the various governmental levels of law enforcement 
(USDOJ, 2005a, p. iii). A 2004 report by Jeffrey W. Seifert recognizes that technologies 
and processes available today, such as those explored in this chapter, are intended to 
enhance data sharing among the various governmental agencies in an effort to better 
“connect the dots” (pp. CRS-2). In addition, the National Strategy for Information 
Sharing (2007) recognizes the need to strength the intelligence community’s capabilities 
throughout the intelligence cycle and encourages both horizontal and vertical sharing of 
information, as well as intelligence, with other homeland security providers and 
responders. Of importance in this strategy is the stated goal of information “access” by 
state, local, and tribal governments and the acknowledgment that these entities are “full 
and trusted partners” (White House, 2007, p. 3). However, the intelligence community’s 
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Information Sharing Strategy regarding the “access” to information by state, local, and 
tribal entities is narrowly defined in that the intelligence community will “provide” 
mission-based intelligence to those entities (United States Intelligence Community, 2008, 
pp. 9–10). The knowledge gap created by this strategy is of concern. Each state, local, 
and tribal law enforcement agency operates in a somewhat unique environment, an 
environment with which it is intimately familiar and which it has the ultimate duty to 
protect and serve. How do state, local, and tribal law enforcement officers request 
“mission”-specific information when they do not know what information is available? 
Furthermore, how do members of the intelligence community “provide” or “share” 
information to these entities when they are not intimately familiar with the operational 
environment? The answers to these questions are outside the scope of this thesis; 
however, the conflict between the “access” to information versus being “provided” with 
information still exists. Although federal agencies have made great strides in attempting 
to address this knowledge gap issue, a more viable solution still needs to be developed. 
C. NIEM 
In an effort to address the information gap, DOJ and the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) embarked on a joint effort to develop a data-sharing framework that 
would allow for the seamless electronic sharing of intergovernmental information. The 
DHS/DOJ partnership resulted in the creation of a data-sharing initiative termed the 
National Information Exchange Model (NIEM), which was released in October 2005 
(Kurlander, 2006, p. 1; Cover Pages, 2005, p. 1). According to information contained on 
the NIEM website, NIEM is essentially viewed as “a data model providing the reference 
vocabulary for consistent and repeatable interagency and inter-domain exchanges of 
information” (USDOJ, 2010, p. 1). 
As a result of varying data and format standards among agencies, NIEM set out to 
capitalize on the data standards developed by Global to facilitate the exchange of data 
among various agencies like the Department of Transportation, Department of Health and 
Human Services, and domains such as Intelligence, as well as other departments and 
domains (USDOJ, 2007, pp. 1–3; Kurlander, 2006, p. 1).  
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One component of NIEM is the use of Extensible Markup Language (XML), a 
computer programming language for encoding documents in order to exchange 
meaningful information regardless of the computer system used. This was selected by the 
DOJ as the open standard for the exchange of information between various governmental 
entities. XML simple language rules provide the framework for interpreting the meaning 
of data in order to allow for the exchange of information among disparate systems 
(USDOJ, 2010, p. 1). According to an XML Journal article written by Neil Kurlander in 
2006, Global was tasked with developing and implementing a “Justice-specific” XML, 
later identified as “The Global Justice XML Data Model (GJXDM) (p. 1). Detailed in 
DOJ’s Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative report is the design of GJXDM and 
how the framework of NIEM allows real-time information to be shared not only between 
the broad law enforcement community, but also throughout the public safety, emergency, 
and disaster management agencies as well (2009, p. 13). 
The exchange of terrorism-related information, as envisioned with the 
development of NIEM, is enhanced with deployment of the Information Sharing 
Environment (ISE), Functional Standard (FS), and Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR). 
The systems used to store and share information documented in a report like SAR include 
the National Data Exchange (N-DEx), e-Guardian, COPLINK, and the Law Enforcement 
Information Exchange (LInX). Although NIEM is designed to help law enforcement 
agencies disseminate and share information using consistent exchange standards and 
processes, the fact remains that there are multiple systems available, each with varying 
data sets, capabilities, and costs. Therefore, the question is, “Which of the knowledge 
management systems should California law enforcement agencies use to enhance their 
situational awareness and information-sharing capabilities?” 
D. N-DEX 
In March 2008, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Criminal Justice 
Information Services (CJIS) division deployed its version of an information-sharing 
system called the National Data Exchange (N-DEx) (Federal Bureau of Investigation  
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[FBI], 2008, p. 1) (FBI, , n.d.2, p. 1). The N-DEx was developed as part of the LEISP 
strategy and involved the input of members from various U.S. executive law enforcement 
associations, DOJ, and DHS (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.1, p. 1).  
The stated vision and mission of the N-DEx is that the system will provide 
nationwide interconnectivity for the various levels of governmental entities in order to 
facilitate the sharing of critical crime- and terrorism-related information. Initially the 
system stored incident/case reports and allowed 50,000 users to search and retrieve those 
reports. The second phase of the system, which became operational in July 2009, added 
the following data sets: arrests, bookings, and incarceration information. In addition, 
another 50,000 users are now supported by the system. Slated for implementation by the 
summer of 2010, the third phase adds probation and parole data and increases the 
supported user group to 200,000 participants (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.2, p. 
1). Although this is a major step in the right direction, there are many available data 
sources missing (i.e., parking, traffic, field interview, and crime report data). 
According to FBI, CJIS representative Rita Willis, N-DEx is a web-based system 
that can be accessed by law enforcement agencies from the Law Enforcement Online 
(LEO) website, and it supports NIEM, the LEISP, and XML standards. According to 
Willis, the purpose of the national information-sharing system is for law enforcement 
agencies to connect to regional nodes like ARIES in Contra Costa County (northern 
California) or RJIS in San Diego County (southern California), which will then be 
connected to N-DEx. Law enforcement agencies can be either a “participating agency” 
by sharing information from their records management systems (RMS) within a regional 
node or simply participate as a “user only” agency. The initial cost for a “participating 
agency” is estimated to be in the thousands to tens of thousands of dollars in order to data 
map the agency’s information; however, there are no recurring costs, nor are there any 




E-Guardian is a system similar in design to the FBI’s classified Guardian system; 
it is different from the N-DEx system in that N-DEx collects information other than just 
terrorism-related information. E-Guardian, launched in January 2009 by the FBI, in their 
effort to facilitate close to real-time sharing of suspicious activity information—with a 
possible nexus to terrorism—with other law enforcement entities. Using a secure Internet 
portal, FBI-approved law enforcement officers and other homeland security professionals 
can access information contained in the e-Guardian system. Currently e-Guardian only 
provides an officer with the ability to search the system. In the future, e-Guardian may 
provide other capabilities such as chat rooms, link analysis, and geo-spatial mapping 
(National Terror Alert, 2009). The disadvantage of e-Guardian is that it is primarily for 
SARs and not readily accessible by most law enforcement officers.  
F. COPLINK 
In 1996, the Tucson, Arizona Police Department (TPD) recognized the need to be 
more efficient and effective in their knowledge management process (Monroe, 2000, 
p. 1). Funded by the DOJ Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice (NIJ), 
the development of an information-sharing system for TPD was awarded to the 
University of Arizona, Artificial Intelligence Lab (UAAIL) (University of Arizona, n.d., 
p. 1; Sochan & Chen, n.d., p. 1). The short- and long-term goals of the new information-
sharing system involved the integration of TPD’s databases (i.e., RMS, Computer Aided 
Dispatching (CAD), and ELVIS) as well as the Arizona Crime Information Center 
(ACIC) and the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) databases (Sochan & Chen, 
n.d., p. 1). 
According to John Monroe, University of Arizona professor Hsinchun Chen had 
previously addressed knowledge management problems at the CIA and Department of 
Defense. Monroe attributes the following statement to Professor Chen: “Knowledge 
management generally refers to methods used to track and analyze all the information 
stored in an organization’s various data sources. The key is to extract the information 
from those sources, consolidate it and then index it so it is fully searchable” (2000, p. 1).  
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COPLINK is the product developed by UAAIL to solve TPD’s knowledge 
management concerns. Using a simple Web browser interface one can access COPLINK 
from a secure Internet link. Due to the successful implementation and ease of use of 
COPLINK, the Phoenix Police Department joined COPLINK, and the two cities (Tucson 
and Phoenix) envisioned other departments joining COPLINK as well, thereby expanding 
the available information and user network (Monroe, 2000, p. 1). 
Although initially developed by the UAAIL, Professor Chen founded the 
Knowledge Computing Corporation (KCC) in order to sell, maintain, and update 
COPLINK for use by other law enforcement agencies and the private sector (Monroe, 
2000, p. 1; University of Arizona, n.d., p. 1). Currently, more than 35 law enforcement 
agencies throughout the United States belong to the COPLINK network (Knowledge 
Computing Corporation, n.d., p. 1). In 2009, KCC merged with i2. Like KCC, i2 provides 
electronic intelligence and investigative management solutions to law enforcement 
agencies, as well as other homeland security agencies and the private sector (i2, 2010).  
According to Emily Robinson, California Emergency Management Agency (Cal-
EMA) COPLINK coordinator, in 2008 Cal-EMA Secretary Bettenhausen approved the 
expenditure of $3.8 million for the statewide purchase of COPLINK licenses for all 
California law enforcement officers. Robinson was hired in December 2009 to facilitate a 
statewide records management system (RMS) integration project that will allow 
California law enforcement agencies to electronically share information. She is in the 
process of establishing a statewide working group to assist her in addressing challenges 
and developing integration solutions. COPLINK is one solution under consideration to 
rectify the knowledge gap that exists in California today. Robinson’s research has led to 
the identification of 14 COPLINK nodes, either in production (7 nodes) or in the process 
of implementation (7 nodes), throughout California. However, many of these nodes are 
currently stand-alone systems (personal communication, Emily Robinson, July 20–21, 
2010). 
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On July 21, 2010, Robinson provided attendees at the statewide RMS Integration 
Node Project Managers meeting a draft copy of “Coplink in California.” A review of this 
draft document reveals that 23 county and 159 city law enforcement agencies either are 
or will be participating in COPLINK in California (Robinson, 2010, pp. 5–14). 
In order for an agency to participate in COPLINK, there are fees over and above 
the license fees paid for by Secretary Bettenhausen. According to COPLINK 
representative Robert Fund, costs associated with joining the COPLINK system also 
include the cost to integrate the data from the agency’s various databases and annual 
maintenance fees. In some instances, agencies also pay hardware infrastructure costs 
associated with developing a COPLINK node (data warehouse). For example, the 
estimated cost for Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Department’s recent COPLINK system 
purchase is $500,000, with an initial $75,000 annual maintenance cost. After the first 
year, the annual maintenance cost is expected to be reduced to an estimated $50,000. 
According to Fund, COPLINK supports XML, complies with NIEM, and currently 
interfaces with N-DEx, DHS (ICEPIC), and OneDOJ. However, the interface from 
COPLINX to N-DEx will cost an agency another $40,000, plus a 15% annual 
maintenance fee (personal communication, Robert Fund, October 2, 2009). 
G. LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION EXCHANGE (LINX) 
According to former FBI agent Dan Estrem, the actual development of the Law 
Enforcement Information Exchange (LInX) began prior to 2000; however, at the time it 
was known as the Gateway Information Sharing Initiative (GISI). Three agencies (FBI, 
Illinois State Police, and St. Louis Metropolitan Police) agreed to test the concept of 
sharing criminal investigative records from a single integrated database. A DOJ COPS 
grant helped to fund the GISI project, which was further supported by the FBI. At the 
time, the GISI was a unique proposition—the sharing of information among three 
agencies in a data warehouse environment. The GISI project, developed by Veridian 
Company, also provided data mapping and analytical capabilities to the users (personal 
communication, Dan Estrem, October 15, 2009). 
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After the events of September 11, 2001, the FBI pushed to use the GISI in all of 
the joint terrorism task forces (JTTF). A key feature of LInX is the ability to produce link 
analysis diagrams within minutes, in comparison to the months it previously took 
analysts and investigators to complete the same task (Gateway Information Sharing 
Initiative, 2002, p. 5). 
According to information received from LInX representative Dennis Usrey, LInX 
meets NIJ and DoD technical and security standards, and it complies with GJXDM and 
NIEM. Unlike COPLINK, which is now maintained by i2, LInX is run by a governance 
board made up of representatives from the participating agencies (i.e., agency chief, 
sheriff, or SAC). The governance board determines who is allowed to participate, and the 
board establishes all the operational policies, rules, and oversight (personal 
communication, Dennis Usrey, September 16 and 21, 2009). According to Ventura 
County Sheriff’s Department’s LInX board member, Deputy Chief Gary Pentis, the 
Southern California LInX node requires agencies to submit their records management 
system information in order to participate (personal communication, Gary Pentis, 
September 2, 2009). This includes all of the traffic and field interview records missing 
from the N-DEx data bases. 
LInX representative Dennis Usrey provided a list of law enforcement agencies 
either currently or in the process of participating in LInX; five sheriff’s departments and 
65 police departments are or will be LInX participants (personal communication, Dennis 
Usrey, July 27, 2010). The minutes of the “Southern California Board of Governance” 
meeting of July 10, 2010 revealed that LInX-to-LInX node integration is now a reality 
and that current “LInX users … now have access to nearly 500 million records including 
30 million mug shots contributed by nearly 600 agencies” (personal communication, 
Dennis Usrey, July 27, 2010). Unlike COPLINK, several federal agencies also participate 
and share information in LInX. 
The evaluation criteria used to assess each of the law enforcement information-
sharing platforms includes associated costs, national standards-based formats, 
functionality, capability, and access. Table 4 provides a visual display of some of the key 
differences between the platforms evaluated. 
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Table 4.   Comparison of Data-Sharing Information Systems 
 
Research has shown that terrorists and more sophisticated criminals present new 
realities for law enforcement agencies that require increased collaboration in information 
gathering and intelligence sharing (Peterson, 2005, p. vii). Both COPLINK and LInX 
satisfy this needed collaboration and information-sharing requirement; however, unlike 
the high annual fees of COPLINK, LInX currently provides similar functionality and 
capabilities with minimal associated one-time costs for data migration efforts. This 
feature—no annual costs—is especially important for law enforcement agencies in 
California, given the current difficult economic times. In addition, LInX participants 
include both local and federal homeland security agencies, whereas many local 
COPLINK users are resistant to sharing information with federal entities through the use 
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of the COPLINK system due to the inability of the federal agencies to sign a mutual 
indemnification clause contained within the COPLINK Memorandum of Understanding. 
A letter dated May 5, 2010, from IACP President Michael Carroll to the Honorable 
Loretta Sanchez, outlined the IACP’s understanding of the “Anti-Deficiency Act” and the 
“Adequacy of Appropriations Act”, which, in essence, prohibits a federal governmental 
agency from entering into an agreement that leads to financial repercussions (Carroll, 
2010, p. 1). The letter states, “The IACP requests that Congress review this issue and take 
all steps necessary to remove this obstacle to critically needed information sharing 
between federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies” (Carroll, 2010, p. 2).  
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The data presented in this chapter are based on a survey tool distributed in April 
and May 2010 to 58 sheriffs’ departments and 340 police departments throughout 
California. In a review of the survey responses, 163 “consent to survey” entries are 
recorded. Of those 163 survey responses, six are from the same agency, and 49 failed to 
answer any additional questions, leaving 108 remaining responses, a 27% response rate. 
The survey tool itself describes—among other things—the current level of 
automation and information sharing, the information-sharing systems in use, employed 
policing programs, the status of intelligence-led policing, and the intelligence capabilities 
among California municipal agencies and county sheriffs’ departments. However, there 
are limitations to this survey because it was sent electronically to agency individuals and 
relies on full and accurate completion by the individual, barring a few exceptions. Those 
exceptions are the result of the author’s operational knowledge of a particular respondent 
agency or personal communication with an agency representative—not necessarily the 
original respondent—for clarification purposes. 
Furthermore, the to state with much confidence that the results of the aggregate 
survey are indicative throughout all California law enforcement agencies is hindered by 
the 27% survey return rate. However, one is able to extrapolate the data further by 
separating sheriffs’ department responses (28) from those of municipal police agencies 
(80). An analysis of the survey responses at this level allows one to infer, with some 
degree of confidence, trends throughout sheriffs’ departments, due to the 48% survey 
return rate. 
A. AGENCY DEMOGRAPHICS 
As Table 5 demonstrates, approximately 84% of the survey respondents who 
answered the question, “What is your position within the organization?” hold 
management to executive-level positions within their agency. This response rate provides 
insight into how managers and executives have interpreted and implemented various 
policing programs, technologies, and systems within their agency.  
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Table 5.   Survey Respondent’s Position within Organization 
 
Table 6 presents the size of all but one of the respondent agencies. The range 
options are listed in the table below. As one can see from the information provided, the 
greatest number of responses came from agencies with 101 to 200 employees, and the 
outliers include one agency with as many as 7,500 employees and one with 20,000 
employees.  
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Table 6.   Number of People Employed by Respondent’s Agency 
 
Total agency personnel (sworn and non-sworn) 
Answer Options Municipal Count County Count 
0 to 25 5 1 
26 to 50 14 1 
51 to 75 3 3 
76 to 100 12 0 
101 to 200 18 6 
201 to 300 8 2 
301 to 400 7 3 
401 to 500 5 2 
501 to 1,000 3 3 
1,001 to 3,000 5 2 
3,001 to 5,000 0 2 
5,001 to 7,500 0 1 
7,501 to 10,000 0 0 
10,001 to 15,000 0 0 
15,001 to 20,000 0 1 
20,001+ 0 0 
Answered question 80 27 
Skipped question 0 1 
B. AUTOMATION 
According to survey responses, all but one county representative answered the 
question, “Does your agency have an electronic Records Management System (RMS)?” 
An analysis of the answers demonstrates that 98% of municipal and 100% of county 
agencies have an electronic RMS. The survey also asked respondents, “Which electronic 
Records Management System does your agency use?” The responses show that more than 
40 different RMSs are in use in California, with Tiburon listed as the most common 
system.  
Next, the survey respondents were asked to indicate the type of computer-aided 
dispatch (CAD) system used by their agency. All police respondents, and all but one 
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county respondent, answered the question, resulting in 95% of municipal agencies (76) 
and 93% of county respondents (25) currently using a computer-aided dispatch system 
(CAD). 
Further analysis of the 107 responses reveals that 12% of the agencies did not 
have a CAD system and that there were at least 35 different types of CAD systems in use, 
with Tiburon listed as the most common system. 
Although the actual number of disparate RMS and CAD systems is likely to be 
much higher than indicated, due to varying versions and/or a slight customization to off-
the-shelf systems by each agency, the opportunity and capability to share information 
with outside agencies is more likely due to the automated systems. However, there are 
associated programming costs for each of these disparate systems in order to normalize 
and consolidate the information into a useable and shareable format, which for many 
agencies during these difficult economic times may prove to be cost prohibitive.  
C. INFORMATION SHARING 
Of the 107 survey responses, only 65% of municipal (51) and 63% of county (17) 
law enforcement agencies actually share their RMS information with other “local 
agencies.” Survey respondents were also asked whether they shared their agency 
information with their state and federal partners: the results demonstrated that 6% of 
municipal (5) and 11% of county (3) agencies shared with federal agencies and 10% of 
police (8) and 19% of sheriffs’ (5) agencies shared with other state agencies. 
Respondents were also encouraged to list information-sharing systems used by 
their agency—in addition to the response options provided (refer to Table 7 below)—in 
order to share information. Some of the other systems identified by the respondents 
included P2P Data Sharing by OSSI, Citizen RIMS, RIMS Collaborate, Offender Watch, 
VINE, Automatic License Plate Reader (via BOSS), TracNet, Cal Gang, Cal JRIES, 
ARIES, and shared local agency integrated networks such as the Ventura County 
Integrated Justice Information System (VCIJIS).  
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As previously reported, only 65% of municipal and 63% of county agencies share 
their RMS information with other local agencies, however, two sheriffs’ department 
respondents and six police department respondents reported that their agency participates 
in COPLINK. Three police department respondents indicated that their agency 
participates in LInX, but these 11 respondents also indicated that their RMS information 
is not shared. It is possible that these agencies are able to access COPLINK, and possibly 
LInX, without sharing their information, but if one were to assume that the 11 
respondents are mistaken with regard to the sharing of their RMS data, that change 
elevates the local information-sharing effort by county agencies to 70% and by city 
agencies to 75%. This capability is significant because it helps to facilitate the integration 
of an agency’s RMS data with other information-sharing systems like LInX, COPLINK, 
and ARIES. 
Table 7 represents other systems that agencies use to share information and 
illustrates the response to the question, “Does your agency participate in information 
sharing/intelligence sharing by inputting your agency's information into one of these 
shared systems?”  
 56
Table 7.   Data-Sharing Systems Used 
Does your agency participate in information sharing/intelligence sharing by 







Law Enforcement Information Exchange (LInX) 14% 11% 
Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) 29% 14% 
Western States Information Network (WSIN) 50% 43% 
Law Enforcement Online (LEO) 25% 22% 
COPLINK 18% 39% 
N-DEx 11% 5% 
Cody Cobra 0% 0% 
Answered question 28 79 
Skipped question 0 1 
It should be noted that ten municipalities and three county agencies are in the 
process of becoming a COPLINK user. Once those agencies have access to COPLINK, 
the percentage of municipal agencies sharing information through COPLINK will 
increase from 39% to 52%, and county agency participation will increase from 18% to 
29%, should they chose to share their information. Additionally, one city agency is in the 
process of connecting to LInX; therefore, city LInX participants will increase from 11% 
to 13% once that process is complete. When COPLINK and LInX results are combined, it 
is apparent that 65% of cities and 43% of counties recognize the importance of sharing 
information and are committed to sharing information through their participation in these 
data-sharing systems. 
Table 8 provides the reader with a broad overview regarding the percentage of 
California county and city law enforcement agencies with automated RMS and CAD 
systems, the levels of sharing RMS information, and the current and near future data-




Table 8.   Level of Information Automation and Sharing 









Computer Aided Dispatch System (CAD) 93% 95% 
Automated Records Management System (RMS) 100% 98% 
Sharing with local agencies 63% 65% 
Sharing with state agencies 19% 10% 
Sharing with federal agencies 11% 6% 
Answered question 80 27 
Skipped question 0 1 
Current/future information sharing through LInX, 
COPLINK, ARIES, and/or ARJIS 77% 79% 
Answered question 79 28 
Skipped question 1 0 
D. POLICING PROGRAMS 
Survey respondents were asked, “Which policing program(s) does your agency 
participate in? (Check all that apply).” Table 9 represents the results of this question, 
broken down by police and sheriffs’ departments.  
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Table 9.   Policing Philosophy Employed 






  Percentage Percentage 
Community Oriented Policing (COP) 86% 89% 
Problem Oriented Policing (POP) 66% 41% 
Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) 23% 15% 
COMPSTAT 34% 7% 
Traditional Policing 58% 70% 
Answered question 80 27 
Skipped question 0 1 
Respondents were also given an opportunity to describe alternative policing 
models employed by their agency. One respondent wrote, “We are moving toward a 
geographic based policing model that incorporates components of most of the above 
programs with a focus on both quantitative and qualitative out-come measures.” Other 
policing models mentioned include: 
 STAT TRAC (“a variation of COMPSTAT”). 
 Geo-policing/area command; 
 Values-based policing; 
 Geographic-based policing, 
E. ILP IMPLEMENTATION 
To assess the level of ILP implementation, survey participants were specifically 
asked, “Does your agency incorporate the ‘Intelligence-Led Policing’ (ILP) philosophy 
into its operations?” All 27 of 28 sheriffs’ departments and 79 of 80 city respondents 
answered the question. Their response shows that 33% of county (9) and 43% of city (34) 





question sent the 43 respondents to another series of questions intended to elicit more 
information about their ILP policing model and level of implementation, discussed later 
in this chapter. 
It is interesting to note that 5 of the 9, or 56%, of the sheriffs and 18 of the 34, or 
47%, of the police respondents who answered affirmatively to the ILP philosophy 
question did not also identify it as a policing model employed by their agency; had they 
done so, Table 9 would have reflected 33% of sheriffs and 45% of police employing ILP. 
The 45 city and 18 county survey respondents who indicated that they did not 
incorporate the ILP philosophy were directed to another section of the survey; however, 
two city and two sheriff respondents failed to complete any questions within this section, 
leaving a response pool of 43 city and 16 county. The remaining 59 respondents were 
given the following additional information about ILP: 
Jerry H. Ratcliffe (2008) defines ILP as "a business model and managerial 
philosophy where data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal to an 
objective, decision-making framework that facilitates crime and problem 
reduction, disruption and prevention through both strategic management 
and effective enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious 
offenders. 
The respondents were then asked, “Do you believe your organization would be 
interested in adopting this approach to preventing crime?” Analysis of those responding 
to the question show that 44% of sheriffs (7) and 58% of police (25) respondents believe 
that they would be interested in adopting ILP. An additional 19% of sheriffs (3) and 30% 
of police (13) respondents might be interested in ILP for their agency.  
The next question provided the 59 respondents with the following information: 
According to a Sept. 2005 report from the U.S. Department of Justice—
Office of Justice Programs—Bureau of Justice Assistance, ILP 
implementation may require several changes within your organization 
such as: 1) an evaluation of policies and procedures to ensure intelligence 
is incorporated into the planning process as agencies address issues within 
their communities; 2) information sharing is a policy matter, not an 
informal practice; and 3) the development of quality analytical staff, 
techniques and systems to assist in the intelligence process.  
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The question immediately following the provided information was, “Do the 
potential changes to your agency in order to implement ILP seem prohibitive?” Table 10 
presents a breakdown of the 43 remaining city and 16 remaining county respondents. 
Table 10.   ILP Implementation Commitment by Non-ILP Agencies 
U.S. Department of Justice—Office of Justice Programs—Bureau of Justice 






Yes 33% 38% 
No 37% 44% 
Maybe 30% 19% 
Answered question 43 16 
Skipped question 0 0 
As previously mentioned, an additional series of ILP-related questions were posed 
to 34 police and 9 sheriffs’ department respondents whose agencies integrate the ILP 
philosophy into their business operation. However, three police respondents failed to 
answer any questions within this section and were therefore removed from the 
calculations. These remaining nine county and 31 city survey respondents were asked, 
“Does your agency have a formalized ILP program (i.e., written policies and 
procedures)?” An analysis of the responses demonstrates that 89% of sheriffs and 90% of 
police respondents incorporate the ILP philosophy within their agency on an informal 
basis. 
Thirty-one police and nine sheriffs’ department respondents were asked, “Which 
answer best describes your agency’s understanding of ILP?” Table 11 demonstrates the 







Table 11.   Respondent’s Definition of ILP 






  Percentage Percentage 
Intelligence product for decision-makers which 
drives your operations 26% 22% 
Approach similar to COP 23% 11% 
Collaborative philosophy 13% 11% 
None of the above 6% 0% 
All the above 26% 33% 
Other 3% 22% 
Answered question 31 9 
Skipped question 0 0 
The survey tool shows that 100% of police and 100% of sheriffs advocate using 
intelligence to some extent in directing their agency’s operations. Table 12 illustrates the 
respondents’ answers to following question, “How often are your agency resources 
directed as a result of an intelligence product?” 
Table 12.   Use of Intelligence Products 






  Percentage Percentage 
Not at all 0% 0% 
Rarely 13% 11% 
Sometimes 45% 44% 
Frequently 39% 44% 
Don’t know 0% 0% 
Other 0% 0% 
Answered question 31 9 
Skipped question 0 0 
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The 31 city and nine county survey respondents were asked, “If your agency is 
using the ILP policing model, how long have you been involved in this practice?” 
Twenty-two percent of sheriffs and 29% of the existing police respondents did not 
answer the question. The remaining responses demonstrate that 86% of sheriffs and 82% 
of police have been using ILP for more than a year. Table 13 provides a detailed 
breakdown of the responses. 
Table 13.   Length of Time That ILP Has Been Practiced 
 
How long agency has practiced ILP   
Answer Options Police Response % 
Sheriff 
Response % 
Less than 1 year 36% 14% 
1 year 9% 0% 
More than 1 year 36% 71% 
More than 3 years 9% 0% 
More than 5 years 9% 14% 
More than 10 years 0% 0% 
Answered question 22 7 
Skipped question 9 2 
F. INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY 
The next series of questions, intended to access an agency’s current intelligence 
capability, had the potential for 80 city and 28 county agencies to respond. However, four 
city and three sheriffs’ respondents did not answer, and one sheriffs’ respondent did not 
understand and therefore failed to answer the question, “What is your agency’s 
intelligence capabilities?” Respondents were encouraged to check all applicable answers. 
The answer garnering the highest survey results reveals that 54% of police agencies have 
someone assigned to perform their intelligence function on a collateral or part-time basis, 
and 38% of sheriffs’ departments have more than one person assigned to perform their 




Table 14.   Level of Intelligence Capabilities 






  Percentage Percentage 
One (1) person assigned full-time 22% 17% 
More than one (1) person assigned full-time 20% 38% 
Collateral or part-time assignment 54% 29% 
Personnel assigned to a JTTF 21% 21% 
Personnel assigned to a Fusion Center 8% 21% 
Access to and use of a regional officer(s) through a 
MOA or JPA 9% 8% 
Other 3% 4% 
None 4% 8% 
Answered question 76 24 
Skipped question 4 4 
Next, 80 city and 28 county respondents were asked whether their agency 
employs crime analysts and/or intelligence analysts; all but one of the city and one of the 
county respondents answered the question. Analysis of those responses show that 56% of 
sheriffs and 62% of police agencies have one or more crime analysts, and 19% of sheriffs 
and 20% of police agencies have one or more intelligence analysts. 
G. HOMELAND SECURITY MINDSET 
In the next series of questions, of the initial 80 city and 28 county, only 74 city 
and 25 county survey participants responded to questions related to the following 
scenario:  
A citizen reports seeing the same vehicle parked at the rail station on at 
least three occasions. Each time the subject has remained in the vehicle 
and has been seen taking photographs of the area. Police respond and talk 
to the subject. The subject is not an employee of the rail station, is not a 
rider and is not picking anyone up at the station. The officer clears the call 
as "subject contacted, unable to establish a crime.”  
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In order to determine whether or not their agency recognizes the importance of 
documenting the suspicious activity described in the scenario above, the respondents 
were asked, “Given the scenario above, what would your agency do with the information, 
if anything? (Check all that apply).” An analysis of the responses demonstrates that 98% 
of the respondents recognized the importance of documenting the suspicious activity in 
some fashion. Table 15 provides a detailed breakdown of responses.  
Table 15.   Suspicious Activity Scenario 
Given the scenario above, what would your agency do with the information? 






  Percentage Percentage 
Document information on Suspicious Activity Report 39% 28% 
Document on incident or similar type report 41% 52% 
Submit field interview/contact card/form 68% 48% 
Use a specific Computer-Aided Dispatch clearance 
code  23% 24% 
No documentation 0% 0% 
Answered question 74 25 
Skipped question 0 0 
Equally important to determining whether or not the agency documents the event 
is to learn what the agency does with the information, once collected. Therefore, the 
respondents were asked, “If your agency documented the event described above, what 
does your agency do with the information? (Check all that apply).” One city respondent 
failed to answer the question.  
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Table 16.   Documentation Outcome for Suspicious Activity 
If your agency documented the event, what does your agency do with the 






  Percentage Percentage 
Give information to detective unit 58% 40% 
Give information to intelligence unit 42% 24% 
Turn information over to FBI 36% 12% 
Turn information over to the fusion center 33% 32% 
Enter information into an intelligence database 22% 20% 
Don’t know 0% 4% 
Other (please specify) 25% 36% 
Answered question 73 25 
Skipped question 1 0 
Eight of the nine sheriffs’ department respondents clarified their “other” response 
with a written comment. The following indicates the number of responses for the given 
action taken: 3 “RIMS”; 1 “OES”; 2 “TLO”; 1 “Patrol”; 1 “CMA”; and 1 entry into an 
automatic database. The sheriffs’ responses demonstrate that all but one knew that the 
captured information should be given to someone or entered into a computer database for 
future recall and potential analysis. 
Similarly, all eighteen of the police respondents clarified their “other” response 
with the following notations: 2 “Nothing”; 7 “TLO”; 3 “RMS”; 1 “RIMS”; 1 “RTIIS”; 1 
“TRAK FLYER Critical Reach”; 2 “Patrol”; and 1 “contact local agencies for 
similarities.” Although the number of respondents who indicated that they would do 
nothing with the information is low, it is still a concern since 100% of police agencies 
need to recognize the importance of collecting, documenting, and sharing information if 
we are to be effective in preventing crime and the next terrorist attack. 
 66
Finally, 74 police and 25 sheriffs’ department survey respondents were asked, “If 
the information generated from the scenario above is given to your agency detective 
and/or intelligence unit, what would members of those units do with that information? 
(Indicate the highest probability of action).” Two police and three sheriffs’ department 
respondents failed to answer the question. In addition, based on their responses, four 
respondents (3 police and 1 sheriff) did not understand the question and therefore were 
removed from the equation. In some instances, respondents identified more than one 
answer as equally probable and therefore the overall computation exceeds 100%. An 
analysis of the responses indicates that 99% of police and 133% of sheriffs’ department 
respondents thought the information would be reviewed and/or investigated further. Ten 
percent of police and 33% of sheriffs’ department respondents thought there would be no 
further follow up or action. 
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VII. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
Although federal law gives the primary responsibility for the investigation of 
terrorist acts to the FBI, the role of state and local law enforcement in identifying, 
preventing, and responding to these events is extremely important to the overall effort. 
Many believe that local law enforcement officers are more likely to intersect with 
terrorist players than any other entity inside the country. Intelligence-led policing and 
integrated data networks are our best tools for fulfilling the role of local law enforcement 
in homeland security. 
Furthermore, the criminals that law enforcement officers face today are more 
sophisticated and operationally agile due to the vast and instantaneous information found 
on the Internet and the ease and availability of various mass transit systems. This 
paradigm shift causes law enforcement agencies to combat crime in a more structured 
and modernized business process manner. Rather than simply relying on previous 
policing models, law enforcement executives—to coin a phrase from Mark W. Johnson—
need to “seize the white space” by identifying ways to better serve the community (2010, 
p. 7). Using Johnson’s framework for strategic change, visionary police leaders can bring 
new community value to policing by assessing their current policing model and defining 
their constituents’ “job-to-be-done”; identifying gaps in their crime detection and 
prevention efforts; developing a new or reengineering their current policing model; and 
implementing the new value-added policing model (i.e., ILP) to support their customers’ 
“job-to-be-done” (pp. 25–28). I assert that the law enforcement customer’s idea of the 
“job-to-be-done” is to keep themselves, their loved ones, and their personal effects safe, 
and to feel safe and secure in their home, work, and play environments. Therefore, the 
integration and use of the intelligence cycle as a standardized policing practice is 
necessary to improve efforts to prevent hometown crime and terrorism. Today’s complex 
policing environment requires police agencies to develop more human intelligence 




and to augment other information collection (i.e., open source, electronic surveillance) 
and data sharing efforts (i.e., integrated data-sharing systems) in order to be effective. 
ILP provides the proper framework for working within this context. 
Much of the available literature suggests that a unified community-oriented 
policing strategy implemented under the guiding philosophy and framework of 
intelligence-led policing will focus law enforcement efforts in a more proactive and 
preventive fashion, as well as better equip agencies to partner with communities, private 
businesses, non-profit organizations, other departments, agencies, and jurisdictions in the 
pursuit of providing a safe and secure environment for people to live, work, and vacation.  
However, the research and my survey tool reveal that the COP philosophy is not 
wholly accepted or uniformly applied throughout the California law enforcement 
community, even though many government-sponsored studies and reports recognizing 
the value of COP exist. As a result of this weak response to the COP philosophy, 
California law enforcement agencies hinder their crime and terrorism prevention efforts 
because a robust and fully functional ILP program needs assistance from the public and 
members of the business community to increase its effectiveness.  
More alarming are the results of my survey related to ILP. There are two separate 
questions regarding the use of ILP among California law enforcement agencies. First, 
respondents were asked to identify all of the policing philosophies employed by their 
agencies. According to the survey responses, only 15% of sheriffs and 23% of police 
departments employ ILP. Second, respondents were specifically asked whether their 
agency incorporates the ILP philosophy into their operations; however, this time 33% of 
sheriffs and 43% of police respondents checked “yes.” The discrepancy between these 
two answers calls into question the validity of responses to the second question, leaving a 
dismal application of ILP in sheriffs’ departments (15%) and police agencies (23%). 
Assuming 33% of sheriffs and 43% of police agencies do employ ILP, only 11% of 
sheriffs and 10% of those “ILP” agencies have formalized ILP programs. To enhance the 
ILP capabilities among those agencies, it is recommended that police executives and 
managers use the LEIU Audit Checklist (2004) to ensure their agency’s criminal 
intelligence practices are in accordance with applicable laws. Next, these agencies should 
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formalize their criminal intelligence practices by adapting and incorporating the Criminal 
Intelligence Model Policy (2003) developed by staff at the IACP National Law 
Enforcement Police Center. 
Those agencies who indicated that they do not incorporate ILP into their 
operations were directed to another series of ILP-related questions. The remaining 
respondents were provided Jerry Ratcliffe’s (2008) definition of ILP and information 
from a Bureau of Justice Assistance report (2005) regarding potential organizational 
changes to implement ILP. An analysis of this pool of responses indicates that 44% of 
sheriffs and 58% of police agencies are interested in adopting ILP as defined by Ratcliffe. 
However, 38% of sheriffs and 33% of police respondents thought the organizational 
changes needed to implement ILP were prohibitive. Over the last 20 years, the various 
components of ILP have proven to be an effective crime management tool. Moreover, 
research demonstrates that reliable information, expeditiously scrutinized and evaluated, 
can result in the development of an actionable intelligence product outlining efficient and 
productive strategies for preventing and combating both traditional and terrorism-related 
crimes. A statewide collaborative ILP capacity will positively impact the crime rate; 
therefore, all California law enforcement agencies need to adopt the ILP philosophy in 
order to be part of a cohesive, coordinated, and effectively networked community. A 
necessary first step for police executives and managers within agencies not currently 
employing ILP is to read the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group’s 
“Intelligence Guide For First Responders” (n.d.) and the U.S. Department of Justice’s 
report, “Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture” (2005). David L. 
Carter also provides a comprehensive guide for law enforcement agencies looking to 
incorporate the collection and use of intelligence into their operations in his “Law 
Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement 
Agencies” (2004).  
There are two possible solutions to enhance the coordination and cohesiveness of 
the California law enforcement community’s crime and terrorism prevention and 
disruption efforts. The first solution is to centralize the California law enforcement 
community, similar to the policing model found in the United Kingdom or the 
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centralization of the military after the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act. 
Centralization permits the integration of collective capabilities and reduces the effects of 
operational redundancies, jurisdictional turf wars, technology incompatibility, and the 
likelihood of autonomous communication/information-sharing systems. Although a 
similar recommendation was made in the 1960s by the President’s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice (Skoler, 1977, pp. 1–3), the recommendation 
was limited in scope. My recommendation is for municipal police agencies to be 
subsumed into one of the 58 county sheriffs’ agencies. However, the validity and 
viability of a reorganization of this magnitude within law enforcement bears careful 
consideration and needs further exploration. 
A second solution involves the development of a national ILP doctrine that 
encourages acceptance and implementation of ILP at the state and local levels. This is a 
necessary first step to providing a more coordinated and collective approach to saving 
lives and property. Similar to the impetus behind the implementation of COP, ILP needs 
state legislation to facilitate a unified execution and application of ILP throughout 
California. Research shows that ILP provides an effective use of resources, provides 
clarity in evaluating the operational environment, and focuses on the prevention of, rather 
than simply responding to, acts of crime and terrorism.  
Once ILP is fully implemented, one way to assess compliance and the continued 
effectiveness of the ILP business model is through the use of routine audits, surveys, and 
report cards. Although one idea is discussed below, it is important to mention that 
developing one overarching and simplistic measurement tool may not be possible due to 
the complexity and diversity of police work. However, that is not to say that a stringent 
effort to develop such a measurement tool is likely to be in vain. Unlike the limitations 
that academic scholars and law enforcement practitioners faced in previous eras, the 
information and technology available and readily accessible today may yield different 
results for success in our ability to measure and assess the quality and efficacy of police 
services, methods, and practices. 
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For instance, an agency “report card,” similar to the U.K. model discussed in 
Chapter IV, and issued to all California law enforcement agencies would serve a dual 
purpose. First, it would hold agency executives accountable for the vitality and 
effectiveness of their COP and ILP programs. Secondly, it would provide an effective 
measure of public trust and confidence—both of which are critical components of an 
effective community partnership/relationship from which crime information can be 
gleaned. The basis of the “report card” could be developed from the Department of 
Justice’s Uniform Crime Reporting information, citizen surveys, and through physical 
audits. To facilitate and enhance government transparency, the “report card” would be 
posted on all law enforcement websites and the attorney general’s website. Suggested 
areas of assessment include, but are not limited to the following: 
 Citizen confidence in their law enforcement officers; 
 Citizen satisfaction with their law enforcement services; 
 Service delivery rates (i.e., response times, dispatch times); 
 Workload activities (i.e., number of arrests, citations, public assists, 
quelled public disturbances, community meetings attended, and contacts 
made); 
 Crime reduction information related to crimes of persons and property; 
 Crime solving/clearance rate; 
 Assessment of the agency’s COP program; 
 Assessment of the agency’s ILP program; 
 Number of deputies per one thousand population; 
 Cost of law enforcement services to the area. 
My survey tool, in combination with information from Cal-EMA COPLINK 
Coordinator Emily Robinson, identifies the knowledge gap that still exists among 
California law enforcement agencies. According to survey respondents, 100% of sheriffs 
and 98% of city agencies employ automated RMS, yet only 63% of county and 65% of 
city agencies indicate that they share their RMS information with other local agencies. 
When asked whether their agency participates in sharing information through a system 
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like LInX or COPLINK, the percentage of information sharing increases to 77% for 
county and 79% for city responding agencies. In an effort to further solidify the survey 
findings, I conducted an assessment of the information provided by Emily Robinson and 
Dennis Ursey (personal communications, July 21 and July 27, 2010). An analysis of 
Robinson’s draft proposal, “Coplink in California,” combined with a list of agencies 
received from Dennis Ursey reveals that 183 or more cities (38%) and 41% (24) of 
counties participate in a data-sharing system (i.e., COPLINK, LInX, or ARJIS) in 
California. In comparison, my survey demonstrates that 65% of cities and 43% of 
counties either currently participate in or are in the process of participating in COPLINK 
and LInX. Although this represents a vast improvement in comparison to a time before 
systems like LInX or COPLINK became available, the crucial goal is 100%. Fortunately, 
Cal-EMA Secretary Bettenhausen, his staff, and many police executives throughout the 
state recognize the importance of information sharing and are committed to supporting 
this vital goal by establishing a statewide RMS Node Integration Project working group 
to facilitate the full integration of these systems throughout the state. 
Many California law enforcement agencies benefit from Homeland Security 
Grant Program (HSGP) funds, COPS grants, and other state and federal funding 
mechanisms. The funding plan—intended to complement and support national, state, and 
local homeland security strategies—has little oversight and accountability once the funds 
are received. One suggestion to assist law enforcement agencies in becoming more 
unified and coordinated in their policing efforts is that the programs funded by these 
grants become more narrowly focused in order to more strategically direct and guide the 
efforts of local law enforcement agencies, as the Home Office does in the United 
Kingdom. For example, in California, there are several data mining/data warehouse 
solutions to further the sharing of information among law enforcement agencies. 
Currently there is no ability for the COPLINK and LInX systems to exchange 
information; therefore, the California law enforcement community must begin to apply 
political pressure on COPLINK and LInX executives in order to develop an interface 
between the two systems, thereby allowing access to the sharing of information between 
both systems. In addition, instead of allowing agencies to use HSGP monies to fund any 
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one of a number of systems, only those proven systems that can functionally interface 
and share information should be allowed. Furthermore, the grantees should holding 
California law enforcement agencies fully accountable for the funds they are awarded by 
conducting on-site audits to verify claimed equipment purchases and programs that were 
promised by the agencies to be implemented. 
Finally, the ability to identify, locate, and arrest dangerous criminals—including 
terrorists—are core competencies of California law enforcement officers. The strategic 
approach to locate and apprehend criminals and to disrupt their criminal actions is 
through a robust intelligence-led policing program. The ILP framework recommended in 
this thesis requires California law enforcement to 1) enhance and expand upon its ILP 
capacities by becoming familiar with and fully embracing the ILP philosophy (planning 
and direction); 2) to strengthen its use of the COP philosophy throughout its 
organizations and solidify statewide coordinated crime detection and disruption efforts 
using coordinated information and intelligence-gathering practices (collection); 3) 
participate in statewide electronic data-sharing systems and fully integrate and share its 
crime- and terrorism-related information both vertically (federally) and horizontally 
(other state and local law enforcement agencies) (dissemination).  
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